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HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

ONE HUNDREDTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

GLASNOST: THE SOVIET POLICY OF "OPENNESS"

MARCH 4, 1987

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PUBLIC HEARING ON GLASNOST: THE SOVIET POLICY OF "OPENNESS"

TUESDAY, MARCH 24, 1987

House of Representatives,
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe,
Washington, DC.

The Commission met, pursuant to notice, in Committee Room 628, of the Dirksen Senate Office Building, at 10:00 a.m., Representative Steny H. Hoyer, Chairman, and Senator Dennis DeConcini, Cochairman, presiding.

In attendance: Commissioners, Representatives Edward Markey and Bill Richardson; Senators Timothy Wirth, John Heinz, Alfonse M. D'Amato, and James McClure.

Also in attendance: Samuel G. Wise, staff director, and Mary Sue Hafner, deputy staff director and general counsel of the Commission.

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN HOYER

Chairman Hoyer. I want to call the meeting of the Commission to order.

This is our second hearing this year of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Seated to my right is our Cochairman, Senator DeConcini. Seated to his right, our former Chairman, the distinguished colleague from New York who did such an excellent job in leading the Commission over the last 2 years, Senator D'Amato, and seated next to Senator D'Amato, Senator John Heinz of Pennsylvania, who is now one of the senior members of the Commission. I am expecting Members of the House to join us shortly. They are probably having problems finding their way over to the upper body, as they like to refer to it.

We want to thank our witnesses. This hearing is on glasnost, the term that is new to many of us, interesting to all of us, and one which I am sure is going to be the subject of much debate.

On behalf of the Commission, I am pleased to welcome such a distinguished group of witnesses. I want to welcome particularly Ambassador Hartman from Moscow and thank Professor Goldman and Mr. Stone and Mr. Reddaway for coming here to share their thoughts with us.

Our subject today is something we have been hearing quite a bit about in the last 6 months, the new Soviet policy, glasnost, openness. Rarely a day seems to pass without some evidence that Mr. Gorbachev is shaking up the sediments of Soviet society. Prisoners have been released; censorship has been lifted a bit; and there is talk of secret ballot elections for the party and the workplace.

But beyond that, our information is sketchy at best. Glasnost has not been applied to outsiders looking in. The motors of the Kremlin still remain a mystery.

What then is glasnost? Is it a series of public relations gestures designed to gain political capital in the West? Is it a tactic to reinvigorate socialism, to facilitate the smooth running of a totalitarian state? Or is it a sign of real progress in human rights and democratization?

Many in the West find glasnost encouraging. We welcome, of course, prisoner releases and de-Stalinization. We know that words such as "democracy" or "elections" are not tossed about casually by Soviet authorities. We hear Andrei Sakharov saying there is a change for the better, and some in our media are calling this a great drama or revolution.

But I think it is important to keep in perspective, not to get carried away by what is happening. There is still the reality of rigid controls, forced labor and psychiatric abuse. Refuseniks now face new rules that many believe will restrict rather than assist emigration. The bureaucracy, the main engine of repression, has yet to be moved. Soviet history certainly teaches us that enticing reforms are often followed by long, gray periods of represssion.

Just as we see evidence of hope, there is equal evidence, I believe, for skepticism. Is the glasnost half empty or half full?

There is one further question to ask, it seems to me. What does it all mean for East/West relations? I know I speak for many in saying that the best way for the Soviets to restore international competence is by living up to their human rights undertakings under Helskini. Real progress will be measured not by good gestures or the number of dissidents released or flowery rhetoric, but by the elimination of all arbitrary arrests and confinement.

History will record if glasnost is the first step in that direction.

I and my fellow members of the Commission are looking forward to what this distinguished panel has to offer on these questions.

At this time, before recognizing Ambassador Hartman, I would like to recognize our Cochairman for any remarks that he might want to make, Senator DeConcini.

STATEMENT OF COCHAIRMAN DENNIS DeCONCINI

Cochairman DeConcini. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much, and let me congratulate you on your appointment as Chairman of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Helsinki Commission, as it is known here. I am proud to be your Cochairman.

I also want to pay particular thanks and appreciation to our former Chairman, Senator D'Amato, who as you pointed out did an excellent job as Chairman and has served this Commission well.

I want to welcome the distinguished witnesses here. I, too, appreciate your willingness to come forward and share your views on the new glasnost policy of the Soviet Union.

I would like to mention that I personally met General Secretary Gorbachev when I was in Moscow with Senator Byrd and Cordell in September of 1985, and at that time Gorbachev had been in office for less than 6 months. My initial reaction to Gorbachev during the 3½-hour meeting was that he was a regular hard-liner, doctrinaire Soviet leader who had grownup in the system; that he was smart on Western ways and had a real understanding of public relations as it relates to the West.

As we focus on Gorbachev's new open policy, I not only think of my personal visit with him, but of Natan Shcharansky's comment at a Helsinki Commission hearing on May 14, 1986, shortly after his release. Shcharansky said that although Gorbachev may have a new tie and a new suit,

> he belongs to his system fully, and this new image which he tries to create doesn't change him and doesn't change the system.

I would also say that when Chairman Hoyer and I were in Vienna November 11, 1986, at the bilateral meetings, we participated with the Soviet delegation to the Vienna Review Conference. At that time I specifically presented to the head of the Soviet delegation, Ambassador Uri Kashlev, several Soviet emigration cases of particular concern to me.

Although you never know if you are really accomplishing anything when you go through this exercise, I must say the meeting with Ambassador Kashlev was one of the better meetings that I have ever had. Ambassador Kashlev responded positively to my request. He knew something about some of the cases, and took notes himself, and certainly went through the exercise of being interested.

In fact, one of the long time refusenik cases that I addressed that day has been released, and furthermore, the son, wife, and daughter of another case that I brought up at that time have been released also.

So I hope that these hearings will give us a better perspective, and I am sure they will, not only as to Mr. Gorbachev's new glasnost policy and initiative, but what we can expect as to real changes that might or might not occur.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HOYER. Thank you, Senator.

Senator D'Amato, would you like to make an opening comment?

COMMENT OF FORMER CHAIRMAN, SENATOR ALFONSE M. D'AMATO OF NEW YORK

Senator D'AMATO. Mr. Chairman, let me commend you and our distinguished Cochairman, Senator DeConcini, for your decision to hold this very timely hearing and to bring in those who are in a position to know best, but particularly Ambassador Hartman. It is good to see the Ambassador here today.

I look forward to their testimony so that we can give proper weight and consideration to this new policy of so-called openness, glasnost, with the various implications attendant thereto.

Mr. Chairman, I am going to ask that my full statement be included in the record as if read in its entirety so that we can get to the business of hearing our distinguished witnesses today.

Chairman HOYER. Without objection, and thank you, Senator.

[Following is Senator Alfonse D'Amato's written statement:]

24 Mar 87

SENATOR ALFONSE D'AMATO
STATEMENT FOR
HELSINKI COMMISSION
"GLASNOST" HEARING

Mr. Chairman:

I want to begin by commending you and our distinguished Co-Chairman, Senator DeConcini, for your decision to hold a hearing on this critical topic. We are witnessing very important and unprecedented developments within the Soviet Union, developments which are certain to have a dramatic effect on U.S. - Soviet bilateral relations, East - West relations, and the future course of world affairs. While these developments are just in their beginning stages, it is most timely to bring together such distinguished witnesses as we have assembled before us today to solicit their views and discuss with them our concerns.

Even in their beginning stages, these developments in the Soviet Union, known by their Russian names as "glasnost" and "perestroika," or "openness" and "restructuring" when translated into English, have affected those areas the Commission watches most closely. Needless to say, the effects in those areas have been positive.

Specifically, reportedly as many as 140 Soviet political prisoners have been released and the cases of another 140 are reportedly under review. Emigration numbers are up dramatically so far this month, building on official Soviet statements made in January and February that many applications were being reviewed. Much wider latitude is being granted in cultural fields in the Soviet Union. And Soviet jamming of the BBC's Russian language broadcasts has ceased.

In the arms control and foreign affairs fields, the Soviets have again decoupled the possibility of an Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) agreement on the basis of the United States' 1981 "zero option" proposal from their demand for limits on SDI research and development, renewing hope for quick agreement in Geneva. They have accepted "on-site" verification, at least in principle, in the INF talks and chemical weapons talks.

The Soviets have hinted at new flexibility on timetables for withdrawal from Afghanistan. They have even suggested that the Mujihadeen might be included in a post-withdrawal Afghanistan government. Their Vietnamese allies have declared an intention to withdraw their troops from Kampuchea by 1990, something which could not have occurred without Soviet involvement.

The Soviet Union has not been bashful about taking credit for these developments. General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev appeared before a February 14 - 16 Moscow forum entitled "For a Nuclear-Free World and For the Survival of Humanity." For this forum, the Soviet government invited prominent people from all over the world, including the United States. In his address to this forum, Gorbachev said that ". . . [E]ssentially revolutionary changes are underway here. They are of immense significance for our society, for socialism as a whole, and for the entire world." He continued, "In brief, we want a broad democratization of all society. Further democratization is also the main guarantee of the irreversible nature of the ongoing processes."

What are these changes, what are they intended to do, and how should we react? These are the key questions we face. Gorbachev provided us with some of the answers, or at least the correct starting points from which to seek the answers in this very same speech.

He said, "It is only by understanding their [these changes'] content, meaning, and aims that one can form a correct opinion about our international policy. Before my people, before you and before the whole world, I state with full responsibility that our international policy is more than ever determined by domestic policy, by our interest in concentrating on constructive endeavors to improve our country." Later, he said, "To preclude any idle talk and speculation, I wish to emphasize that we are going about our reforms in accordance with our own socialist choice, on the basis of our notions about social values, and are guided by criteria of the Soviet way of life."

If we take him at his word, rather than supposing that these Soviet actions are motivated by external forces, then we have to look in detail at the "content, meaning and aims" of his policies in order to judge their purposes and plan accurate responses. This hearing will help us understand these policies so we can reach conclusions to guide our own thinking.

Key questions remain to be resolved. First, we know by name more than six hundred Soviet political prisoners and we have reason to believe there are many more whose names we do not know. So far, less than half this number have even been considered for release according to Soviet statements. When will the rest be set free?

The Soviets have said they are reviewing their criminal code. They have not said what changes they will make in their criminal justice system to prevent, if the political tide should turn, the prompt arrest and incarceration or internal exile of persons who took advantage of the political, economic, and cultural relaxation now taking place. This is the point at which the basic difference between our two systems is most clearly expressed in human terms.

In our system, the state was established to serve its citizens and the power of the state over the life of each individual citizen was explicitly limited. Our government's structure was created to provide independent centers of political power which would be able to balance each other and hold in check any tendency toward excesses which would jeopardize the liberties of our citizens. In this, the bicentennial year of our constitution, the developments in the Soviet Union should draw our attention directly to these key and central features of our political system.

The Soviet system, in contrast, is monolithic in nature, without separate branches of government or any concept of checks and balances on the power of the government. Indeed, the Soviet government has traditionally exercised its power in the same arbitrary and unlimited fashion as did the most bloody and absolute of the Tsars. The Soviet citizen has been treated as an inconsequential cog in the great wheel of the state, whose life and liberty were taken on a moment's whim of some high official and whose right to property was explicitly denied as a hateful relic of an obsolete capitalist past. The rule of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is absolute, as a matter of basic ideology, as a matter of practice, and as a matter of Soviet law.

What we need to learn is whether these developments in the Soviet Union will move away from this past tradition of statist absolutism and toward respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. We hear and read comments such as Gorbachev's I've already quoted about increased democratization and irreversible and revolutionary changes. We make a serious mistake, I believe, if we interpret these comments in light of our own political system and our own values. Democracy does not mean the same thing in a Soviet context as it does in an American context.

Our challenge today is to estimate whether or not the cautious employment of some democratic forms might not open the door to some democratic substance -- whether the economic reforms might not open the door to some elements of free enterprise -- whether the enhanced role of labor unions and cultural figures might not open the door to the formation, on a modest scale, of centers of power not under the control of the CPSU. In the final analysis, we are looking into the future to see to what extent these changes in the Soviet Union could make it less of an aggressive, expansionist, closed, totalitarian empire and more of a pluralist, open system which is capable of becoming a good neighbor instead of an implacable foe -- a system which will make a real attempt to live up to its Helsinki process promises instead of treating them with open contempt.

I look forward to hearing the views of our distinguished witnesses on these matters.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HOYER. Senator Heinz.

BRIEF COMMENTS OF SENATOR JOHN HEINZ OF PENNSYLVANIA

Senator HEINZ. Chairman Hoyer, thank you very much. I just want to make a couple of brief comments.

First, I join with all of my colleagues in welcoming this distinguished panel of witnesses.

I am quite intrigued by glasnost. I wonder if this policy is a breath of spring after a cold, Siberian winter. We, of course, in the Commission are particularly interested, above all, in whether what could be a promising development, glasnost, signals any lasting difference in the area of Soviet human right practices or emigration policy.

And I might extend my initial analogy slightly by saying or questioning, and I hope you will address this, whether this is a spring day with a warm summer to follow or whether it is a spring day which, when stepped into in the fullness of the sunshine and openness of glasnost, is followed for those unfortunate few who do step outside and express themselves by a cold, Siberian winter of confinement, either metaphorical or real.

In other words, is this a serious and, more importantly, lasting effort and structural and, more importantly, social reform within the Soviet Union, or is it a public relations sham to get us to lower our guard and, along with it, the elements of dissent who in the Soviet Union have seen the opportunity for self-expression and criticism come and then go?

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HOYER. Thank you, Senator.

At this time I want to introduce briefly the members of the panel. I will recognize the panel starting with Ambassador Hartman, and I would ask our Commissioners to hold questions until the panelists end so that we can hear them all together. At that time we will have an opportunity for questions.

First of all, the very distinguished Ambassador Arthur Hartman, our immediate past Ambassador to the Soviet Union; has been in the service of our government for over 40 years; has been posted in Paris, Saigon, London, Brussels and Paris; and as I said, is just completing a 5-year stint as our Ambassador to the Soviet Union.

In Washington he served as Special Assistant to Under Secretary of State, George Ball from 1961 to 1963, and as Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs from 1974 to 1977.

To his left, Mr. Peter Reddaway, who is the Secretary of the Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars of the Smithsonian Institution. He is the publisher of many scholarly works, including "Authority, Power and Policy in the U.S.S.R." "Uncensored Russian" and "Russia's Political Hospitals." He has directed the Kennan Institute since January of 1986.

Prof. Marshall Goldman, to Ambassador Hartman's right, is the Associate Director of the Russian Research Center at Harvard University. Professor Goldman has taught economics at Wellesley College, where he has held since 1958 the Class of 1919 chair in economics. He is the author of many publications, including "The

U.S.S.R. in Crisis: The Failure of an Economic System," and the forthcoming "Gorbachev's Challenge: Economic Reform in the Age of High Technology."

To Mr. Reddaway's left is Mr. I.F. Stone, a distinguished journalist, writer, and former Washington editor of "The Nation" magazine. He has a long and prolific career as a journalist, and we are pleased to have him here with us.

With that brief introduction of all of you, and I could have spent the balance of the hearing on introductions since the accomplishments of our panelists are such, I now recognize Ambassador Hartman.

STATEMENT OF HON. ARTHUR A. HARTMAN, FORMER AMBASSADOR TO THE U.S.S.R.

Ambassador Hartman. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I have a prepared statement which you have, and I will not read for you today. It is important that such a statement be in the record because in that statement I try to outline the history and some of the details of this current policy of glasnost.

What I would like to do in introducing this topic in a very shorthanded fashion, because I know you have many questions for us today, is to say something about the context in which this policy occurs.

It seems to me it is more of a policy to try and accomplish other purposes. It is not a policy in and of itself. You have to look at the Soviet leadership today, not only as leaders of a Communist system, as dedicated Marxists/Leninists, which they are, but also as leaders of the Russian people. It seems to me in looking at a policy of openness, at some of the events that have occurred in the last little while, we have to put it into the context of Russian history.

When Senator Heinz asks, for example, "Will this last?" I think some of us have to have a certain amount of skepticism because we will look at Russian history, and it will tell us that this is contrary to all of the trends of that history. At least whatever changes are going to take place today are going to take place very gradually and over a period of time and with great care because the leadership knows what has happened in the past when such trends have been unleashed. I am thinking particularly, for example, of the 19th century when some of the authors were punished by the czarist regime, where many of the authors, indeed, were exiled for saying what they thought and for advocating a different system and less repression.

Much of that did not change under the Communist regime. The repressions got worse under Stalin, and what you have today is a leadership, as I said, of dedicated ideologues who believe in their system and who want to make that system work. It has become clear to them that on the civilian side, on the economic side, on the social side, the system is not working.

This is not just my prescription. This is what the General Secretary himself is saying. The system is not working. He feels that the idealogue philosophers have not modernized Leninism, and that is the reason why the system is not working today.

Others on the outside would dispute this, I think.

He sees a military side of the economy which works very well, which produces weapons, which absorbs modern technology, which is able to come up and actually become a power on a par with the United States, the leading industrial power of the world.

So why glasnost today? It seems to me that the policy has been instituted, a policy of more openness, of more discussion, of more willingness to engage particularly the intellectuals of the country, in order to mobilize the mass of people who essentially have gotten "stuck in the mud."

During the Brezhnev days, and even before, there was much that the leadership tried to accomplish in terms of getting people to work harder, more efficiently, to produce things in a way that was comparable to the kinds of production advances that were being made in the West. This did not happen, and part of this openness policy is designed to get the intellectual community involved, letting authors write and produce films, letting the other intellectuals exercise the kind of leadership qualities they can to inspire people to greater efforts.

I see nothing in the glasnost policy that basically changes Marxist/Leninist doctrine. In other words, they still believe in a strong, powerful, central government apparatus and central party apparatus; that the party should be the leading element in society. When they talk about democracy, they still talk about democratic centralism, and that means leadership from the top, leadership from this Central Committee of the Communist Party.

So it seems to me glasnost as a policy has to be looked at in terms of a policy that is designed to accomplish other objectives. It is not something they are doing in and of itself.

I think we should welcome what has happened because in terms of the things that we in the outside world are interested in, namely the treatment of human beings, the kind of relationship they are prepared to have with other countries in the world, there are some steps that have happened that we must welcome.

When I can receive a telephone call, as I did shortly before I left, from Andrei Sakharov, that is a tremendous change. When I arrived in Moscow, he was an exile in Gorky, and finally his wife was exiled to Gorky.

When we see some of the political prisoners coming out, Koryagin who was imprisoned because of his outspoken opposition to the use of mental institutions for political purposes. He is now out. He is now in his hometown. He is able to speak once again or people can get in touch with him.

But there are limits to what is happening. There are still people in prison. We hope that these cases are all being reviewed. No one should be in prison for political reasons.

In the arts, for example, a young man who played a concert at my house, Vladimir Feltsman, cannot get concert dates in either Moscow or Leningrad because he applied to emigrate. The reason he applied to emigrate was that he was not able to have the kind of contacts with other musicians in the outside world to develop his art. That has not changed. He has not been given permission to emigrate, and he is not being given concerts in the major cities of the Soviet Union.

It seems to me that what is happening now is not designed, as I think was implied perhaps in one question that has already been asked, as a policy to influence the outside world. It has that effect. We are seeing now a new kind of leadership in the Soviet Union. We are seeing that things are being done a bit more freely. Movies that were made 10 years ago and not being shown are being shown. These are good things, but these policies are not being aimed at us: either to fool us or to influence us. Their major effort is to have an effect on the Soviet people, to get that mass of people to believe more in the system, to get that mass of people to work harder, more efficiently, and to produce in a way that will prevent the Soviet Union from falling further behind in these important respects.

My own view is that the leadership is a very orthodox leadership. It believes in Marxist/Leninist principles, and therefore, I am pessimistic that openness or any of the other reforms that are currently being thought about, and they are rather modest in terms of economic organization, are going to have a major effect because what I do not see yet is the incentive for the workers to produce more, to produce better things, to design better, and in general to behave as though incentives existed.

There is a belief at the top leadership that somehow or other dedication to the system itself will be enough of an incentive for the workers to do all of these things, and that, I'm afraid, as an outside observer, I believe is not going to be a successful policy.

Thank you very much.

Chairman HOYER. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

Without objection, your entire statement will be included at this point in time in the record.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Arthur Hartman follows.]

STATEMENT BY THE HONORABLE ARTHUR A. HARTMAN, FORMER UNITED STATES AMBASSADOR TO THE SOVIET UNION, PRESENTED BEFORE THE COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE
MARCH 24, 1987

THE SOVIET POLICY OF GLASNOST

I. INTRODUCTION

During my five and one half years as U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union, top leadership in that country slowly and grudgingly passed from a generation that rose to power under the rigidly totalitarian system of Joseph Stalin to a generation which began its political and professional life in an atmosphere of destalinization and cultural thaw fostered by Nikita Khrushchev.

It is still too early to know what the end result of this generational change will be. It is clear, however, that since becoming General Secretary of the Communist Party in March of 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev has launched an ambitious campaign for reform - reconstruction as he likes to call it - aimed at reversing the pattern of social and economic decline that characterized Brezhnev's later years.

The major themes of this campaign are personal accountability and economic intensification. Gorbachev and those around him appear to understand that if the Soviet Union is to enter the 21st century on a competitive economic and technological footing with the West, they must move now to revamp their industrial base and develop the necessary domestic capacity to compete with the West and the industrialized Far East in the development of computer and communications technology.

So far, however, the leadership has not dealt with the truly difficult problems of economic reform (e.g. their overly-centralized system of economic decision-making or artificial prices for goods and services that do not reflect real supply and demand). Instead, Gorbachev has focused his energies on educating the Soviet public about the failings of the Brezhnev era and appealing to people to play an active role in righting the situation.

To do this has required a frankness and candor unprecedented in recent Soviet history. Unpleasant facts, from natural disasters to economic failures, have been systematically kept from public attention. Even specialists whose knowledge could be useful in dealing with a given problem often have not had access to relevant data - either because it was officially withheld or because those in power conspired to hide failure in false statistics.

To turn this state of affairs around Gorbachev has introduced his policy of glasnost, usually rendered in English as openness or publicity. Glasnost has many elements, which I will examine in detail, ranging from greater candor in the media to a relaxation of the KGB's harsh drive against dissidents. Their common objective is to make everyone - from the man in the street to artists and scientists - feel that they have an important contribution to make to Soviet society.

II. THE ELEMENTS OF GLASNOST

Gorbachev's Personal Style

Since becoming General Secretary in March 1985, Gorbachev has adopted a populist approach to leadership, strikingly different from that of his immediate predecessors and perhaps most reminiscent of Nikita Khrushchev's sometimes flamboyant style. Through a series of well publicized forays onto the streets and into the factories of Moscow and Leningrad, Gorbachev early on sought to make direct contact with the general public and encourage people to speak openly about the problems of their daily lives. He set a tone of candor and projected an image of a man determined to come to grips with problems that had long been ignored.

The Media

In addition to providing the means through which Gorbachev reaches the widest possible Soviet and foreign audience, Soviet media now cover subjects and events which in the past would never have been discussed publicly. Reports on natural disasters such as earthquakes or man-made catastrophes like the sinking of a Soviet cruise ship have now become commonplace in the media. Manned Soviet space launches, only rarely televised in the past, now receive regular TV coverage. Perhaps most dramatically, Soviet media promptly reported on riots in the Kazakh city of Alma Ata in December, riots that were a direct result of Gorbachev's appointing a new communist party leader for the republic.

The media have become a sounding board for both the leadership and general public to voice criticisms of past policy, bureaucratic corruption and abuse of authority. Party and government leaders have been attacked by name in the press for poor performance or malfeasance of duty - often as a prelude to involuntary retirement - and the Brezhnev leadership as a whole has been criticized for failing to come to grips with a host of pressing social and economic problems.

Certain social themes that have for years been ignored in public now receive open media treatment. After years of denying that there is a drug problem in the Soviet Union, for example, both the press and TV have in recent months mounted a campaign to expose the problem of drug abuse, particularly its effect on young people. Other social problems such as prostitution and the spread of AIDS are being acknowledged and discussed publicly for the first time. (Although the propagandists have spoiled their openness record by trying to link AIDS to a U.S. biological research program.) Environmental issues are receiving more public attention, but again with major slips such as Soviet suppression of news of the Chernobyl accident until it was announced by Sweden.

In addition to redefining the acceptable limits of domestic discussion, the media are now more open to carrying foreign opinion as well. Such noted figures as David Owen, Harold Saunders, Ambassador Robert Neumann and Richard Pipes have all been allowed to express their views in the Soviet media in recent months.

Culture

Glasnost has also had a significant effect on the Soviet cultural environment. The conservative first secretary of the Cinema Workers Union, for example, was ousted in May of last year after 20 years in that position. His replacement, Yelem Klimov, is noted for having tested the limits of official acceptability in his film making. He has consistently produced controversial works, some of which the authorities refused to release in the Brezhnev era. Since Klimov took over the top job at the union, a series of striking films has appeared, probing themes rarely discussed in Soviet art.

Perhaps the most noteworthy of these recent releases is Repentance, a Georgian movie made several years ago but not widely circulated due to the sensitivity of its theme. Repentance is a penetrating look at the purges of the 1930's, and the lead character is clearly modelled after Stalin's chief henchman in the secret police, Lavrentiy Beria. The film places responsibility for the purges squarely on Stalin and Beria.

New leadership also took over the Writers Union in 1986 and a number of important authors were restored to official favor, including early Soviet poets Anna Akhmatova and Nikolay Gumilev, most of whose works have been suppressed since the

Stalin era. The great emigre novelist Vladimir Nabokov is now being published for the first time in the USSR, and the Soviets have publicly announced that they will publish Boris Pasternak's monumental work, Dr. Zhivago.

In an equally sharp breach with past practice, the authorities have invited artists who defected from the USSR to return to perform in the Soviet Union. Theatre director Yuriy Lyubimov and dancer Mikhail Baryshnikov are among those who have been so invited.

In the music world, emigre pianist Vladimir Horowitz received a warm welcome when he played before Soviet audiences last year, and there has been a much greater willingness to allow western pop music groups - once scorned as a symbol of bourgeois decadence - to tour the Soviet Union.

The situation of Soviet pianist Vladimir Feltsman, however, serves as a sobering reminder that the fate of artists, like the fate of others in the Soviet Union, ultimately depends on the whim of the state apparatus. Mr. Feltsman is an artist of international acclaim who, since applying to emigrate to Israel, is only rarely allowed to perform and never allowed to play in major concert houses. No amount of "openness" or cultural liberalization can offset the fact that, when they think it serves their purposes, Soviet authorities are willing to make a conscious effort to destroy the future of a brilliant artist.

Science and Social Sciences

Andrey Sakharov's return to Moscow has proven a landmark event for Soviet science as well as the Soviet human rights movement. Since his return he has been allowed freely to express his views on arms control issues with Soviet and foreign colleagues alike. He openly critiqued both Soviet and American positions and helped coordinate the scientific forum in the international peace conference held in Moscow in February. Sakharov's unique situation is perhaps the most dramatic individual reflection of Gorbachev's appreciation for the need to stimulate the USSR's best minds to tackle the difficult domestic and international issues the country faces.

Among social scientists Izvestiya commentator Aleksandr Bovin wrote a remarkably candid review of recent Soviet history in the journal New Times in January. The article, entitled "Reserve of Memory", dealt with two earlier attempts to reform Soviet society - Khrushchev's effort in the 1950's and Aleksey Kosygin's proposed reforms of 1965. Both policies met serious reversals, and Bovin urges that his readers keep these precedents in mind as the current "struggle" for reform proceeds.

There have also been favorable public references to Lenin's New Economic Policy (NEP) of the 1920's, which introduced elements of a market economy to the budding socialist system. Traditionally, Soviet historians have presented NEP as a necessary evil brought on by the need to help the country recover from the ravages of civil war. In recent references in the media, however, NEP has been portrayed as a positive move. Gorbachev himself mentioned Lenin's support for NEP in a July speech. Similarly, in a recent letter to a Soviet newspaper, a historian wrote that his colleagues should stop presenting the October revolution in "threadbare and inexpressive" works that hedge sensitive questions.

Glasnost has also resulted in a great deal more information being available to the public on such social issues as crime, the black market and alcohol abuse. The Central Statistical Administration recently released figures on the grain harvest for the first time in five years, and on infant mortality for the first time in 12 years. The latter figure confirms that the Soviet Union lags well behind the West in this key indicator of a nation's standard of living.

Basic Freedoms

One of the most dramatic elements of the new spirit of glasnost has been the release from prison and labor camp of significant numbers of Soviet political prisoners. The Soviets publicly announced in February that 140 such people were being released and that another 140 cases were under review. There have also been statements that the laws under which these people were prosecuted would be reviewed.

The figure of 140 prisoners represents almost 20 per cent of the approximately 700 to 750 known political prisoners (the number of actual prisoners is probably higher, perhaps somewhere over 1,000). So far the Department of State can confirm over 90 releases. Most of these people were arrested for so-called anti-state crimes: slandering the state or engaging in so-called anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda. In fact their crimes were often nothing more than speaking out publicly on Soviet human rights abuses, practicing or teaching their religion, or trying to emigrate.

These releases are a welcome change from the waves of arrest and repression associated with the Brezhnev, Andropov, and Chernenko years, and indicate a major change in Soviet domestic policy. Viewed together with Andrey Sakharov's return to Moscow, it would appear that the Soviet authorities are prepared to broaden the limits of acceptable public comment and social activity. How those limits will take concrete form remains to be seen, but the progress to date is welcome.

At the same time, even if the Soviets make good on all 140 of the announced releases and follow up favorably on the additional 140 cases under review, fully 60 per cent of the known political prisoners will remain incarcerated or in exile. That anyone should be imprisoned for allegedly slandering the state is deplorable, and there can be no talk of genuine openness as long as such people remain in camps and such laws are on the books.

Democratization

At the January meeting of the communist party's central committee, Gorbachev introduced a new political dimension to glasnost. In his 6-hour opening speech he reasserted the basic themes of his overall economic restructuring program - personal accountability and economic intensification - and made a dramatic call for "socialist democratization" of party and government bureaucracies and commercial enterprises. He advocated secret ballots and multiple candidates competing for the same job.

There is a distinct difference, however, between Gorbachev's use of the term "democracy" and our own. Allowing some choice at the bottom or in enterprises is designed to bring about greater participation by the masses. Direction will still come from the top and the central party mechanism.

"Socialist democratization" can also be understood as an attempt to deal with the problem of bureaucratic resistance to implementing Gorbachev's reforms. Once it is fully in place, the plan to have multiple candidates vying for the same post would give Gorbachev the leverage he needs to replace recalcitrant officials, who enjoyed virtual lifetime tenure under Brezhnev, with people of his own choosing.

III. THE LIMITS OF GLASNOST

In all of the areas discussed under the rubric of glasnost, there are still severe limits on personal expression and public activity. Acceptable public criticism of government policy, for example, is limited largely to criticism of past policy, particularly that of the Brezhnev era.

Criticism of Gorbachev and his reconstruction program remains oblique, as criticism of the current party line always has. It is couched in references to progressing too quickly or respecting socialist tradition. One does not see direct criticism of any government or party official for being overly zealous in implementing reform, even though Gorbachev himself has acknowledged in his public statements that opposition to his programs exists.

As noted above, for all of their new-found frankness Soviet media still carry the crudest forms of disinformation, such as the accusation that the disease AIDS was developed by the CIA as a biological weapon. Fear of information from the West is still sufficient for the authorities to continue to jam most Western radio broadcasts, including Voice of America, Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty.

One of the most graphic manifestations of the limitations inherent in glasnost occurred in February of this year in response to public demonstrations in support of Jewish cultural activist Iosef Begun, imprisoned since 1983. After an initial display of tolerance for the first few days of the demonstrations, KGB thugs attacked demonstrators and western journalists as they stood on the sidewalk of a major Moscow thoroughfare. Although Begun was ultimately released, the authorities had sent a clear signal to the public that they would not be pushed too far.

Of particular interest to Americans is the plight of US-Soviet dual nationals - residents of the USSR who have a valid claim to U.S. citizenship. There are currently 19 such people who have been denied permission to emigrate to the United States. We are actively pursuing the possibility of a bilateral agreement with the Soviets on dual nationals that would facilitate their travel to countries where they have citizenship. At the same time we will continue to press for resolution of individual cases.

Also of special concern is the problem of separated spouses - cases in which a Soviet citizen is not allowed to emigrate to the United States to be with an American husband or wife. The Helsinki Final Act specifically refers to marriage between citizens of different states and provides for the same treatment of their requests to marry and reside together as called for in family reunification cases.

There are currently 12 cases of separated spouses on the U.S. government's representation list, a list we present to Soviet officials as a formal expression of our concern over these families. Although some have been resolved in the past 18 months (normally on the eve of high-level U.S.-Soviet meetings), we will not be satisfied until all such situations are resolved.

Basic to the notion of the free flow of information and ideas is the free travel of people. The Soviet Union, however, continues to limit travel abroad to a select few, carefully vetted by the state apparatus. Emigration remains extremely difficult, despite the USSR's commitment under the Helsinki Accords. To apply for emigration often carries with it grave consequences for the applicant, such as loss of his job and exposure to KGB harassment. While we have noted with interest recent Soviet statements that some 10,000 emigration applications are being reexamined, we must withhold judgement until we see whether emigration actually increases significantly as a result.

Again, as I noted earlier, the Chernobyl nuclear accident of May 1986 revealed glasnost's limits. Despite the tremendous effect the accident had on neighboring countries, some of them Warsaw Pact allies, the Soviets reverted to their traditional approach of treating such events as a secret. Even when the Soviets were forced by the pressure of mounting evidence gathered abroad to admit there had been an accident, they did not supply the kind of detailed information necessary to allow other nations to evaluate the extent of the danger.

In the arts many of the great works of Russian and Soviet literature are still published largely for sale overseas or in special hard currency stores to which average Soviet citizens do not have access. It remains virtually impossible to find a copy of the Bible in any Soviet bookstore.

IV. OUTLOOK

As this process of change unfolds in the Soviet Union, what should the posture of the United States be? I think the answer to this question is fairly clear. We must continue to pursue our dialogue with the Soviets in all the areas of our agenda: regional issues, arms control, human rights and bilateral relations. Although the Soviets would prefer to limit the dialogue to arms control, we've been telling them that for Americans, you can't have the positive atmosphere necessary for arms control agreements without resolving problems in other areas: Afghanistan, individual human rights cases, emigration. This isn't linkage; it reflects strong American concerns, and we will base our conclusions not on Soviet promises but on Soviet deeds.

As we expand contacts with the Soviets, we've made a point of asking ourselves what we stand to gain from specific cooperative ventures. Agreements must never be viewed as rewards for good behavior or concessions that we grant to the Soviets; they must be negotiated on their own merits and be of direct benefit to the United States. We are not interested in agreements for the sake of agreement.

To most of us in the West, Glasnost, even with its inherent limitations, seems a long-overdue antidote to the cynicism and corruption associated with the Brezhnev regime. In fact, it goes against the grain of most of Soviet history (and much of pre-revolutionary Russian history as well) when most people were specifically excluded from having any input into the development of political and social policy. These areas have been viewed traditionally as the personal domain of party and government officials in Moscow, and the private individual was expected to do little more than respond appropriately to each new government initiative.

Because Gorbachev is challenging this traditional pattern of Soviet society, he is encountering no small degree of opposition. Many in the central administrative apparatus see Gorbachev's reaching out for support outside government and party organs, together with his direct criticism of past government performance, as a serious threat to their position.

Gorbachev openly spoke of reluctance to implement his reforms at the January plenum of the party's Central Committee. In his opening remarks he stated that "...in many economic, government, state and even party bodies, and in work collectives themselves, far from everyone is marching in step with the demands of life." He added that "many people, while supporting innovations, believe that people must reorganize somewhere higher up,...that this must be done by everybody except themselves."

As I suggested earlier, Gorbachev's proposal for "socialist democratization" is an attempt to deal with this problem. "Elections", with the process well controlled from above, would put the old guard on notice that their jobs depend on responding properly to the new party line. Press attacks of the past few days against former Politburo member Kunaev send a clear signal that no one can take his position for granted.

Whether Gorbachev will ultimately be successful in making glasnost a permanent feature of the Soviet political landscape remains to be seen. If he does, he will still face the task of leading the Soviet command economy out of the 1960's and into the 21st century. This he can only do by coming to terms with incentives for individual economic activity. Glasnost is a first step toward establishing a freer atmosphere in the market of ideas. Gorbachev may hope that it will make the transition to a freer, less centralized economic environment somewhat easier.

My own strong view is that Mr. Gorbachev is a "believer" in the ultimate success of Marxism-Leninism. If it should come to a choice between those principles and a freer atmosphere, the latter will give way.

Chairman HOYER. I would now like to recognize Professor Goldman.

STATEMENT OF MARSHALL GOLDMAN, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR, RUSSIAN RESEARCH CENTER

Professor GOLDMAN. Thank you very much for inviting me here. I have a fuller statement which I will submit. I would like to read a portion of it and then make some comments.

Even the hard-liners are being forced to concede that something new is taking place inside the Soviet Union. Although a product of the Communist Party and the bureaucracy like his predecessors, it is hard to deny that Mikhail Gorbachev is trying with all of the energy and political skills he has to revamp not only the Communist Party and the bureaucracy, but the entire social, political and economic systems of the country.

The dimensions of what he is trying to do are breathtaking. Deng Ziaoping has tried to do the same thing in China, but so far with very mixed results. Gorbachev seems equally ambitious and in many ways more determined, and he is proceeding at a much faster pace. Yet so far he seems to be encountering widespread resistance, and there is relatively little to show for what he has done.

His more radical economic proposals, as the Ambassador just indicated, such as the authorization of private business and joint ventures with capitalist businessmen so far have not been implemented. There is a lot of discussion, but as yet no action.

Similarly, Gorbachev's call for secret ballots and multiple as well as nonparty candidates for government and party positions, and even elections for factory and farm managers, has been opposed and only one or two actual experiments have occurred.

But one reform where there has been notable change is the new glasnost policy. Admittedly, glasnost is far from universal. Yet as imperfect as the implementation of glasnost may be, what we tend to forget is that Gorbachev is only just completing his first 2 years in power. Given all that he has attempted to do and how he has dominated the news, it seems like he has been in office a decade, not just 2 years and a few weeks.

But so far it is unfair to expect complete success. In fact, because the Soviet system has been so firmly entrenched, it is all the more remarkable that any change at all has occurred.

What I would like to do now is look at how far glasnost has gone and what are the chances that Gorbachev can succeed.

First of all, I think it is important to look back and see when glasnost began with Gorbachev. Even before he took office, he began to discuss the issue as early as, for example, December of 1984. Why?

The question that everybody asks is: How can a man of the system come out of it and be what looks like a traitor to it? It is hard, believe me. Certainly Sovietologists used to argue that no one could do anything like this as long as they were a product of the system.

My own belief is that I think when Gorbachev took over as General Secretary, he was shocked by what he found. Clearly, as a member of the Politburo he was not ignorant of what was happening, but the depth of corruption, the depth of ineptness, I think, have overwhelmed him. If you look at what is happening now in terms of the turnover of party people, the turnover is indicative of the kinds of corruption that were taking place, the kinds of little empires that were built. It is easy to be overwhelmed by that.

Another thing that Gorbachev has discovered is that without a system of checks and balances (not necessarily as we have developed them here in the United States) without some kind of control, the system is filled with abuse. On a trip that he made to Khabarovsk last year, he basically called for whistleblowing. It was not a very realistic speech because he was asking the local party officials to allow local party newspapers to be critical. That would be like asking Senator D'Amato, for example, to go to the "New York Times" and say, "By the way, give my administration a closer look." You do not want that kind of thing, and therefore, it clearly was not very realistic.

He also recognized that the worker has some feeling for what is going on. Unless the workers are properly rewarded, there will be no effort on their part. He put it this way in a speech that he gave this year. "A home can be put in order only by a person who feels he owns this house." That is a very different bent from preceding leaders.

Also, sociologists are coming along within the Soviet Union to say our half-truths may be worse than outright lies because if we do not know what is going on, we are going to be taking the wrong kind of action. So we have to recognize that.

Well, how has glasnost been implemented? There are some impressive things: calling attention to a KGB official in the Ukraine who had tried to implicate some reporters in some unfair criticism; the whole Chernobyl reaction; the announcement that ships had been sunk, that submarines had been sunk; the announcement that there are riots; the demonstrations at the Kama River Truck Plant; and most recently the announcement that there was corruption in the military, that the military officials seemingly were involved in harassing other officers and lying to them. That is the first time, just as we saw earlier the KGB had been attacked; that is the first time the military has been attacked in the press.

After Chernobyl, for the first 2 weeks there were outright lies about Chernobyl, and even in the aftermath there were lies about Chernobyl. When they said, "See we have not told any lies about Chernobyl," that in itself was a lie.

Riots have been discussed by some reports coming from the State Department. There was a riot in Minsk about increased prices. There was a riot in the Ukraine about increased prices. There were also denials at first that there were any deaths at Alma Ata during the Kazakhstan riots, but deaths also occurred.

There have been some secret speeches that have not been publicized, a speech by Eyeltson—the head of the party in the Moscow region—only came out in a samizdat fashion and Gorbachev himself was censored. In that speech that I mentioned to you when he was calling for whistleblowers, it was because he said there was no multi-party system in the Soviet Union. The reference to multiparty system was exorcized when the report appeared in Pravda.

So glasnost, I would say, is a policy of convenience. It is still not fundamentally rooted in basic openness, but certainly there is an improvement over what there was before.

What are the chances of success? Well, I am not overly optimistic about the chances of success. There are still lots of problems. There is lots of opposition. One Soviet commentator put it this way: "Officials and bureaucrats are resisting . . . 'Stop,' they say . . . 'You are discrediting the system and the party.' " Clearly we are now hearing about things we never heard about before, and so are the people inside the Soviet Union. This shows how far the defenders will go in not being very honest. One proponent of glasnost, in responding to this criticism, said some people argued that we should not criticize Aeroflot because he said "criticism would undermine its prestige or international lines." But, "after this criticism did Aeroflot lose its prestige or international lines because we criticized Aeroflot? Did it suffer?" Well, should we tell him? It seems to me that he's not being very realistic in that sense. Certainly it has affected other things including Gorbachev himself.

There are other vagaries in the system where people are openly distorting what is happening. Letters are still being intercepted in the Soviet mail inside the country. Even a worker who was relieved of his job for complaining to the party officials in Moscow. His letter to Moscow was intercepted by the local authorities; they found the whistle blown on them, and its part of the Gorbachev product in the countryside and calls for more openness.

He meets workers who will address him in the street and say "I tried to blow the whistle, I tried to report the local officials." Gorbachev asks what happened and the man reports: "I lost my job."

Well, of course, thats not something foreign to us. We see that happening in our own courtry and we will have to expect it to happen. But, for Gorbachev its clearly an embarrassing situation.

Let me conclude. Glasnost policy will not be easy. In fact, all the openness may actually make things worse. It may make it look like Gorbachev is inept. Because under his predecessors none of these things happened. Boats didn't sink, submarines didn't sink, you didn't have these kinds of problems; it just never took place.

And therefore, suddenly people are saying "whats wrong? Why are there now so many problems? What kind of leader is Gorbachev?" And then Gorbachev criticizes the system. It's reminiscent of, if you'll excuse the expression, of President Carter. Exactly the same thing now is tending to take place under Gorbachev. They happened before, these things happened before, but they were kept secret. And you may have this—what happens when the people look around and say everything is going wrong.

Gorbachev and I share a strong similarity in some respects. We both have the same same kind of hairline. Gorbachev has one other distinction however, he has this big birthmark on his head. It's interesting that even educated Soviets have heard this rumor, It comes from the religious superstition in the Soviet Union. When people see this birthmark they say it's the mark of Cain. That Gorbachev has been branded by the devil and all these things that are happening, including Chernobyl, including the bad winter. This is God's wrath, the devil's wrath and Gorbachev's punishment. And to the extent glasnost has leads to the acknowledgement of these difficulties it makes it look like indeed God has visited his punishment on the Soviet people.

Now, in addition to all the other problems Gorbachev has, he has to worry about the superstitious, and the mark of Cain.

So, Gorbachev has had to face all these things. But, indeed, I think it's fair to say that there is a chance that some of his changes have been moving forward.

Now, there are those people who say it's the same old system and nothing has changed. I think that's wrong. And I think it's an unfair criticism. Of course, as you've heard, there are still people in camps, there are still people who are punished, the KGB still cracks down on dissidents. How do you explain the fact that there is so much glasnost and yet within the system has not basically changed.

I think we have to go back to what I said in the beginning. Gorbachevs only been in power slightly over 2 years and if you look at it like economists do, in terms of stocks and flow, the stock hasn't changed all that much. But, if you look at it in terms of flow, the dynamic situation, you really have to say, this is a impressive situation.

The question that I'm going to leave you with, and I don't think we can answer ourselves is: "Can he sustain it?" I'm skeptical. I'm a pessimist. I don't think he can last 4 years. I'm hoping that he can last until May so that my book comes out with a title that won't make the book already obsolete. Because as Mr Hoyer said, it addresses Gorbachev's challenge, and without Gorbachev he has no challenge.

Chairman HOYER. You capitalists, you're all alike.

Professor GOLDMAN. That's exactly the point. But I think Gorbachev himself recognizes just how dangerous it is. He admits and even refers to the fact that there is opposition. In one of the most recent speeches he gave while visiting Riga he said this,

> I think that the next 2-3 years will be the most difficult. We'll have progress if we can keep up what we're doing for the next 2-3 years, we'll make headway.

In other words, he's moving so fast that Gorbachev is worried whether or not he'll be able to pursue it. My own prediction is that he won't last 4 years.

[The prepared statement of Marshall Goldman follows.]

GLASNOST': DOES IT REALLY MEAN OPENNESS?

Even the hard-liners are being forced to concede that something new is taking place inside the Soviet Union. Although a product of the Communist Party and the bureaucracy, like his predecessors, it is hard to deny that Mikhail Gorbachev is trying with all the energy and political skills he has to revamp not only the Communist Party and the bureaucracy, but the entire social, political, and economic system in the Soviet Union.

The dimensions of what he is trying to do are breathtaking. Deng Xiaoping has tried to do the same thing in China, so far with very mixed results. Gorbachev seems equally ambitious and in many ways, more determined. He is proceeding at a much faster pace. Yet, so far, he seems to be encountering widespread resistance and there is relatively little to show for what he has done. His more radical economic proposals as the ambassador just indicated such as the authorization of private business and joint ventures with capitalist businessmen so far have not been implemented. There is a lot of discussion, but as yet no action. Similarly, Gorbachev's call for secret ballots and multiple as well as non-Party candidates for government and

Party positions, and even elections for factory and farm managers, has been opposed and only one or two actual experiments have occurred.

But one reform where there has been some notable change is the new *glasnost'* policy. Admittedly, *glasnost'* is far from universal. Yet as imperfect as the implementation of *glasnost'* may be, what we tend to forget is that Gorbachev is only just completing his first two years in power. Given all that he has attempted to do and how he has dominated the news, it often seems like he has been in office much longer—at least a decade not just a year. But so far it is unfair to expect complete success. In fact, because the system has been so firmly entrenched, it is all the more remarkable that any change at all has occurred. How far has *glasnost'* gone and what are the chances that Gorbachev can succeed in his efforts?

I.

As novel as it seems today, the policy of *glasnost'* did not begin with Gorbachev. Lenin actually called for what could be said to be something similar. In March 1918, he wrote "introduction of glasnost' . . . will of itself be an enormous reform and will facilitate the enlistment of the broad masses." (RL R14/87, 1/8/87, p. 4.) In more recent years, Yuri Andropov began his brief career as General Secretary with a crackdown on corruption among both state and Party officials. This was a marked change from the atmosphere of laxness that was associated with most of the Leonid Brezhnev period.

Konstantin Chernenko's succession was marked by considerably less enthusiasm for openness and anticorruption, although there was no return to the laxness of the Brezhnev era. But a look back reveals that as Chernenko's health began to deteriorate, Gorbachev began to sketch out what he would do when he assumed control. In a speech given in December 1984, three months before he assumed formal powers, Gorbachev called openly not only for "the profound transformation of the economy, but for *glasnost'*!" (PEN, p. 5.)

Gorbachev's commitment to *glasnost'* seemed to grow as he came to realize just how bad things inside the country, both economically and politically, had become. As a member of the Politburo for seven years before he became General Secretary, Gorbachev must have had some idea about what was happening, but the utter corruption he has found in republics like Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Moldavia and the Ukraine, not to mention regions like Ulianovsk within the Russian republic itself, has probably come as a shock. For the most part, the local leaders in these areas had set up little empires in many respects independent from Moscow. Left alone this way long enough, the local leaders were able to subordinate to themselves the courts, and of course the Party, which they headed. Feeling protected, state resources were diverted for personal use and abuse, and the national interest suffered. Realizing the Soviet economy could not perform at its optimum as long as these local selfish interests could do as they pleased, Gorbachev decided he needed some system of checks and balances. As he explained in a speech to Party officials during a visit to Khabarovsk in late July 1986, "the local Parties are keeping quite" and are not in effect blowing the whistle on wrongdoing. (FBIS, 8/4/86, p. R16) After all, why should they blow the whistle on themselves? But Gorbachev insisted that "we need publicity in order to insure fulfillment of the tasks" set out by the Party. Thus, local newspapers must be allowed to investigate and criticize because "if we do not criticize ourselves and subject ourselves to analysis—we do not have any opposition parties . . ." we will have no way of preventing or correcting abuses by local Party officials. (FBIS, 8/4/86, R14) And as long as such abuses go unchecked, the workers will have no interest in joining in Gorbachev's efforts at restructuring. As he put it, "a home can be put in order only by a person who feels he owns this house." (FBIS, 1/28/87, R17)

It has taken a long time, but Soviet spokesmen like Tatiana Zaslavskaya are finally beginning to acknowledge openly that "half-truths . . . in a certain sense are worse than lies." She goes on to point out that "if you conceal from people generalized information about the condition of their own lives (i.e., the degree of environmental pollution, the level of accidents in production, and crime rates, etc.) you cannot expect them to become more active in either production or political life. People's trust and support can only be obtained in response to trust placed in them." (FBIS, 2/10/87, p. R11; *Pravda*, 2/6/87, p. 2-3)

II.

Although it is difficult to measure these things, the likelihood is that the main impetus for the *glasnost'* policy is that Gorbachev sees this as a way to address domestic needs. However, there is no denying that the Soviets also expect that there will be a payoff internationally as well. More honesty and openness bring with it applause from the West and more respectability. The Soviet Union will never be accepted as a full member of the family of nations until it changes its undemocratic domestic policies and the introduction of *glasnost'* is a critical step in that direction. The Soviets have also come to recognize that as long as they hold back information at home, their press will continue to lack credibility. As long as the Voice of America and BBC carry the news about events in the Soviet Union before the Soviet media do, Soviet listeners will continue to turn on their shortwave sets before listening to domestic broadcasts.

This is not to suggest that on occasion *glasnost'* may be targeted almost entirely for foreign audiences. For example, when Soviet authorities decided to release 120–150 political prisoners in February 1987, the announcement came from Gennedi Gerasimov, the spokesman for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Only a week or two later did the Soviet press carry a very brief announcement about their release. (NYT, 2/20/87, p. A10)

III.

Because the policy is so new, it is only to be expected that its implementation would be imperfect. On the impressive side is the acknowledgement that a KGB official in the Ukraine harassed and unjustly incriminated reporters from the local Ukrainian newspaper, as well as from *Pravda.* The Soviet press has also begun to discuss police brutality. (NYT, 2/18/87, p. A12) After more than a week's delay, they were also unusually fothcoming about the Chernobyl disaster. Recently they have also been reasonably prompt in reporting ship sinkings, mine disasters, train wrecks, and even the two-day riot between Kazakhs and Russians in Alma-Ata, the capital of Kazakhstan. They also acknowledged that there had been "wild protests" by disgruntled workers at the Kama River Truck Plant in Brezhnev.

But the *glasnost'* policy is not yet perfect. In many ways the biggest test occurred at Chernobyl, and there the Soviets fell far short of what they should have done. They said nothing to the Soviet Union as a whole and to the outside world for almost three days after the explosion took place. Even people on the scene were left without guidance for a full thirty-six hours. As a consequence, children were not told to stay indoors and some were observed playing soccer a few miles from ground zero. Moreover, in a perversion of the whole *glasnost'* policy, the Soviet press proclaimed "we have no areas or personnel free from criticism . . . This was clearly confirmed for example, by Soviet media in their coverage of the disaster that occurred at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant. Even in this extreme case! Without any concealment, without fear that enemies would wrongly interpret the facts, the Soviet press truthfully related everything that happened." (FBIS, 6/11/86, p. R11)

Nor even now does the Soviet press reveal promptly or completely everything that has happened. Thus, there are reliable, but so far still no official reports of riots in Minsk over increased prices. There have also been rumors of other nationality riots besides the one that took place in Kazakhstan. Moreover, after first denying that any deaths had occurred in Kazakhstan, two months later Soviet officials acknowledged that at least two people had died. The Soviets have also failed to publicize the full text of a very tough and honest speech Gorbachev gave to Soviet writers in June 1986 and that the head of the Moscow Party Committee, Boris Yel'tsin gave to Moscow city officials in April 1986.

Even those who are most closely identified with *glasnost'* occasionally backslide. Just as they have so often in the past, Gennedi Gerasimov of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Georgi Arbatov of the Institute of the USA and Canada insisted that the plainclothes police officials who were beating up Jewish refuseniks and Western newsmen in February 1987 were "home-grown vigilantes," who took offense at the repeated demonstrations. That a group of vigilantes can resort to violence in broad daylight in the middle of Moscow while Soviet militiamen stand by without interfering suggests that *glasnost'* is still a policy of convenience.

Less blatant but equally disingenuous is the assertion that the Kazakhs who rioted when a fellow Kazakh was removed as a Secretary of the Kazakh Community Party and replaced by a Russian had no reason to be upset, after all, "he was elected unanimously by the members of the Kazakh Communist Party Central Committee Plenum, nearly half of them are Kazakhs." (FBIS 1/2/87, p. R11) Similarly, the assertion that "among the many experiments being conducted in the Soviet economy, the State Acceptance Service (whereby inspectors have begun to reject poor quality products and thereby prevent workers from being paid) is perhaps the most popular" is to say the least an overstatement. (FBIS 1/5/87, p. S2) After all, it was that very policy that sparked the protests by the workers of the Kama River Truck Plant.

IV.

Certainly the *glasnost'* policy still leaves much to be desired. What are its chances for success? As might be expected, *glasnost'* has met with considerable opposition. As one Soviet commentator put it, "officials and bureaucrats are resisting . . . stop! they say . . . you are discrediting the system and the Party." (FBIS, 1/5/87, p. R1) But it must be admitted that those who answer such critics do not always do so in a way that is entirely convincing. One proponent of *glasnost'* explained that for some, official policy precluded any criticism of the airline Aeroflot because "criticism would undermine its prestige on international lines." But it is hard to believe he was serious, particularly when he went on to ask "after this (criticism) did Aeroflot lose its prestige or international lines? It didn't, did it?" (FBIS, 1/5/87, p. R1) Should we tell him?

In other more dramatic instances, proponents of more openness have been fired from their jobs and expelled from the Party. Even Gorbachev does not enjoy complete openness. Not only have some of his speeches not been reported, but some of the reported ones have been censored. Thus, when Gorbachev acknowledged that "we do not have any opposition party" in the speech cited earlier, the editors when reprinting his speech in *Pravda* left out that acknowledgement.

V.

Certainly the phenomenon of *glasnost'* has taken the Soviet Union a long way in two years. For this they desire applause, both outside and in the Soviet Union. But it is not yet a complete process. Moreover, there is good reason to worry whether such a policy will ultimately succeed. In addition to all the pitfalls already mentioned, there is also the danger that in the midst of all this new openness, Gorbachev's abilities as a leader may be called into question. Look how much has gone awry since he has taken over! It is not that such disasters have not happened before—they have—but few people knew about them because they were not publicized. Now everyone knows and some may even conclude that all this bad news is evidence of Gorbachev's faulty leadership. Equally dangerous is the concern, which is evidently widespread, that these tragedies are not so much the consequence of poor leadership but the wrath of the devil. Among the superstitious in the Soviet Union, of whom there are millions, there is the firmly held belief that the prominent birthmark on Gorbachev's forehead is in fact the mark of Cain and that as long as Gorbachev is leader of the Soviet Union, the devil will inflict punishment on the country. This is how not only all these new disasters are explained, but even the cold weather of January 1987.

Given all these obstacles, the future of *glasnost'* and Gorbachev is uncertain. Nor is there much that we in the United States can do, since if the assumptions here are correct, this is primarily an internal process. Obviously it would help Gorbachev if he could reach an arms agreement with the United States. Success here would provide him with momentum for his domestic policies. Otherwise the best we can do is acknowledge that something new and better is happening inside the Soviet Union. When there is backsliding, we should be quick to criticize, but when there are positive developments, we should be equally quick to applaud. Positive reinforcement in the Soviet Union could help Gorbachev. Given the enormity of what he is trying to do, he can use some encouragement now and then, particularly if it comes from those who have in the past insisted that no one could be bold enough to do what Gorbachev is indeed attempting to do.

Chairman HOYER. Well, not much newsworthy here apparently.

Next, Peter Reddaway, the Secretary of the Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, centered at the Smithsonian Institution.

Mr. Reddaway, we are very appreciative of your being here with us.

STATEMENT OF PETER REDDAWAY, SECRETARY, THE KENNAN INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCED RUSSIAN STUDIES

Mr. REDDAWAY. Thank you.

I have also offered my statement for the record, and I will present here just a very brief summary of one or two points; plus I will elaborate, at the request of your staff, on the human rights aspects, which is something I follow particularly closely.

As I see it Gorbachev's overriding medium term goal is a sustained revitalization of the Soviet economy because without it, abroad the Soviet Union will not be able to play the role in world affairs that it wants to play, and at home ultimately the political power of the party will be threatened by a long-term economic decline.

To achieve this sustained revitalization of the economy what is needed first, Gorbachev has understood, as Khrushchev understood 30 years ago, is a revitalization of society and the political system. The means to that immediate goal are two in Gorbachev's terms: first of all, glasnost, which we are talking about here today; and secondly democratization within the framework of the existing political system. These are twin policies, each one promoting the other.

What is the definition of "glasnost?" I think a convenient, short one is openness in public life, that is, more freedom and less controls in politics, the mass media and culture. The amount of it that is present at the moment is very uneven. There is a lot, for example, in the area of social problems; very little on the issue of Stalin.

In the 1960's, Mr. Khrushchev's glasnost policies—even though they were not called that, they were the same thing—were reversed by his successors after they ousted him, not 100 percent reversed, but perhaps something like 50 percent.

In the future it seems to me Gorbachev's glasnost policies may be reversed somewhat less than by 50 percent by him or by his successors, but the important point is that they are reversible because ultimately it is the Kremlin that turns the various taps on and off.

Now, some more precise comments about glasnost in relation to dissent and emigration. Here the picture is likewise so far very spotty and uneven, and it is not at all clear how far things are going to go in the next months and years. I think it will be useful for me to present a sort of checklist of how far things have gone in various respects.

First of all, as regards the release of political prisoners, so far only about 90 out of the several thousand political prisoners in the Soviet Union have been released, although official statements have indicated that about 280 cases are going to be reviewed, not necessarily leading to releases in all cases.

Of these 90, the great majority are well known intellectuals, mostly from Moscow and a few other big cities. Only a few are intellectuals from the national minority republics, such as the Ukraine or the Baltic Republics, and almost none of these 90 are religious prisoners from the list of almost 300 that we know to be in Soviet prisons at the present time.

The criteria for who is released at the present, at any rate, appear to be two. First of all, in relation to domestic policy, the person has a chance of being released if his release will make a good impression on the educated professional elites of the Russian heartland and will help to mobilize these professional elites in support of Gorbachev's policies.

The second criterion relates to foreign policy. Will the release of the individual concerned make a good impression on governments and publics abroad?

The second item in the checklist is what is the situation regarding new arrests for political or religious reasons, and here the situation is that regarding political arrests, the rate is sharply down, and purely political arrests are now relatively infrequent. But by contrast, the position in regard to religious arrests has not apparently changed as yet. Those continue at a rather high level.

The third point relates to prison conditions, where so far Gorbachev has done nothing. Those conditions remain extremely bad.

It is interesting to note, however, that in the area of political abuse of psychiatry, there are the first indications that maybe the ground is shaking beneath the feet of the Soviet psychiatrists who have been most directly involved in organizing that particular system of abuse.

Fourth, as regards the laws which have been used against dissidents, it has been stated in a number of semi-official statements that these laws are going to be reviewed with a view to revising them, but so far nothing absolutely official has been said, and it is not yet clear what would be the nature of the revisions, even if they take place, although the hints are that it will be in the direction to make these laws less broad, less open to abuse, more closely defined so that there would be less arbitrariness about the whole legal system in relation to dissent.

The fifth point, very important as regards glasnost, is the level of the jamming of foreign radio broadcasts. Clearly, if they were not to be jammed at all, the level of glasnost would go sharply up because there would be an unrestricted new input into the debate in the Soviet Union—what comes over the airwaves from abroad.

The situation so far is that one of the major foreign radio stations, the British Broadcasting Corporation, BBC, has been relieved of jamming, but so far none of the others have, although it has been raised in discussions with the American Government, the possibility of lifting the jamming on Voice of America.

Sixth, as regards emigration, the situation here is that well over half a million Soviet citizens, Soviet Jews, Soviet Germans and Soviet Armenians, have expressed the clear desire to leave the Soviet Union. Apart from a few dozen spouses in Soviet-American marriages and Soviet-French, Soviet-British and other such marriages who have been allowed out in recent months, only about 1,500 Soviet citizens per year are being allowed to emigrate at the present time, which compares with a high point in 1979 of 60,000 per year, 1,500 as compared to 60,000. In other words, emigration is at an extremely low level at the present, and has shown no inclination to rise in the last couple of years since Gorbachev took over.

The law relating to emigration has actually been tightened under Mr. Gorbachev, and as of January 1 of this year, the new provisions of the law have come into effect, which mean that people who wish to emigrate have to be invited by members of their immediate family. This provision was not so narrowly drawn before, and thus, the new law is more restrictive.

It appears that probably something on the order of 20,000 to 30,000 Soviet citizens would qualify for emigration under this newly restrictive law, and it is possible that in the coming year or two, these 20,000 or 30,000 may be allowed to leave, but the question is: what thereafter? Will the situation then just go back to the trickle that we have at present of only a couple of thousand a year?

I think there is a very real dilemma for Mr. Gorbachev here because any significant degree of emigration on a permanent basis goes against—would go against the sense of social unity and cohesion and dynamism which he is trying to instill and develop in Soviet society as he goes about his social and economic goals.

On the other hand, foreign governments, and in particular the United States Government, and the publics of many Western countries feel strongly on the issue of emigration, and they are clearly going to keep up the pressure on Mr. Gorbachev. So he is in a dilemma, and it is possible that at some point he will be tempted to trade off a certain number of emigrants in return for Western concessions of one sort or another.

To sum up, virtually nothing of what I have been saying about the human rights situation has been mentioned in the Soviet media, a strike against glasnost if you like and a clear indication of the limitations involved. The very few mentions that have been made of one or two aspects have been oblique.

The whole issue, in other words, is extremely sensitive in Soviet politics. Gorbachev, in moving as far as he has, has been testing the waters, clearly uncertain how far he can or should go, unsure how his colleagues are going to react, unsure of his own political strength. A second conclusion would be that the current level of freedom in the Soviet Union in relation to dissent is quite markedly less than it was in the good years from 1974 to 1979, when, for example, there was a very low level of arrests, there was a very high level of emigration, there was virtually no jamming of foreign radio broadcasts, and even some de facto freedom of association existed for dissidents.

On the other hand, there is quite significantly more freedom for dissent than there was a year ago.

What about the prospects for dissent and for glasnost in general? I agree with previous speakers who have suggested that overwhelmingly this depends on Gorbachev's own personal position. At the moment I think Gorbachev is still on an upswing, but I am ultimately, I'm afraid, a pessimist regarding the medium term.

I think it is extremely possible that if Mr. Gorbachev continues with his present policies, he will be removed within the next 2 or 3 years.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Peter Reddaway follows.]

Glasnost and the Gorbachev Leadership

by Peter Reddaway (Secretary, Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies)

As glasnost gradually enters the English lexicon to take its place alongside vodka, the knout, sputniks, and other Russian forerunners, it is timely to assess the current meaning, scope and prospects of the phenomenon that it encapsulates in the Soviet Union, and also its possible implications for American foreign policy. In addition, how much will its fate be tied to the personal political fortunes of Mr. Gorbachev?

Glasnost can be defined as openness in public life. Thus it is used mainly in reference to the mass media and culture. Lenin used the word in this sense when in power, and since the mid-1960's Soviet dissidents have campaigned vigorously for it, using arguments very similar to those now deployed by the Kremlin (and usually, till recently, landing in jail for their pains).

Since the word was taken up by Gorbachev and his supporters in 1985, it has become a key slogan and a powerful political instrument. Its purposes when employed as an instrument are multiple. Depending on the context, the aim may be one or more of the following: (a) to reduce corruption by publicly disgracing officials who have committed abuses; (b) to make a power play by portraying certain individuals or institutions in a bad light; (c) to generate, through debate, urgently needed, well thought-out ideas for the reform of social, political or economic policy; (d) to mobilize people on the side of such reform ideas; (e) to enrich cultural life by diversifying and enlivening it; (f) to increase the credibility of Soviet media (and thereby, among other things, reduce the attractiveness of Western broadcasts to the U.S.S.R.); or (g) to encourage the West to think that the U.S.S.R. is becoming pluralistic and democratic, and thereby to facilitate the conduct of Soviet foreign policy.

How exactly does glasnost fit into the Gorbachev leadership's overall strategy? The name of this strategy is perestroika, or "reconstruction". Translated into the language of American presidential slogans, it comes out, not as the New Deal or the New Frontier, but as "New Ways". Perestroika will, Gorbachev says, take years to achieve. It is essential for the patriotic reason that, without it, the Soviet Union will stagnate, will fail to compete in the world, and will be vulnerable. The two main instruments for achieving it are glasnost and "democratization". Glasnost was introduced first, creating the freer atmosphere in which, since January 1987, the drive for democratization has been launched in earnest. This drive was organized when Gorbachev became convinced, after a year in power, that strong leadership by determined men at the top would never be enough to get the country moving again.

In his concluding speech to the Central Committee on January 28, Gorbachev spoke about glasnost like this: "The Communist Party firmly holds that the people should know everything. Glasnost, criticism and self-criticism, monitoring by the masses - these are the guarantees of the healthy development of Soviet society." The people "must know everything and consciously make judgments about everything." Glasnost and democracy "are needed for us to move forward, for accomplishing huge tasks. Without active participation by the people we will not accomplish those tasks."

While Gorbachev is, I believe, sincere in making these statements, they are not invalidated, in his mind, by the continued existence of severe limitations on the scope of glasnost. Indeed, he alluded to the central limitation in the same speech, when he said: "The press must promote glasnost, and keep our people informed. But it must do this responsibly - we express this wish. It must not get side-tracked by sensations, by a search for 'cooked evidence'. We need the press as an active participant in perestroika."

In other words, the press will continue to be primarily an instrument of the political leadership. And this is confirmed by the record to date. The frankest, most sensational materials to appear in the media have consistently coincided, both in topic and timing, with particular policy campaigns conducted by the Kremlin, and have had the clear aim of reinforcing these campaigns. In addition, there is no indication that any of the mass media might in the future be removed from official control and ownership.

It is also important to note that while the glasnost policies of the Gorbachev leadership are more systematic and deliberate than the equivalent ones of the Khrushchev leadership 25 years ago, they are in essence almost identical. In scope and radicality, Gorbachev has surpassed Khrushchev in some respects, but in others, notably the key issue of de-stalinization, he has so far lagged behind. The fact that it was not difficult for Khrushchev's successors to reverse those aspects of his media policies which they disliked means that the same will almost certainly be true of Gorbachev's successors (however soon or otherwise they succeed him).

Let us now look at how far glasnost has gone in selected areas of policy. As indicated, Gorbachev has been circumspect on the Stalin question and other sensitive historical issues. In the last few months, however, he has made some indirect criticisms of Stalin, and anti-Stalinist notes have been heard in the media with increasing frequency. Bukharin and Khrushchev are gradually being rehabilitated, the latter being criticized in the process for failing to break with such aspects of Stalinism as Lysenkoism and exploitation of the peasantry. Destalinization is clearly back on the agenda, and steady progress on this crucial issue, which is highly relevant to serious, frank debate on most current topics, seems likely.

In current domestic politics, glasnost continues to be manipulated by the Kremlin to assist it in ousting a long string of Brezhnev appointees. In a selective way the anti-corruption campaign is targeted on such individuals, and the results are publicized in the press. Beyond this, Gorbachev is now using glasnost to gather support for radical ideas he would like to implement despite opposition from conservatives, namely introduction of the elective principle into the choosing of factory managers, and also giving this same principle more teeth in party elections. By contrast, the campaign to reduce or eliminate the extensive material privileges enjoyed by the nomenklatura, or ruling class, has faded way over the past year in the face of strong nomenklatura opposition. Notable in this connection, however, has been a greater readiness today than in Khrushchev's time to refer explicitly to various forms of opposition to current policies.

In discussions of foreign policy matters, glasnost has had less success. Real Soviet motivations and negotiating positions are still too secret to be debated in public. Interesting developments have, however, occurred. Articles by anti-Soviet foreigners, e.g. Richard Pipes, have been published in full (and of course criticized). And hints of an apparent desire by some elements in the leadership (probably including Gorbachev) to withdraw from Afghanistan have been more clearly expressed of late than they were before. Anti-American propaganda has been somewhat curtailed but can still be vicious. A recent documentary on prime-time T.V., for example, was devoted to vilifying various American leaders. These included President Reagan, who was clearly, if indirectly, compared to Hitler.

Domestic social and economic matters have shown glasnost at its most impressive. Here the Kremlin has printed assessments of the current state of affairs which have been franker than anything published since the 1920's, and also far-reaching proposals for change. Last October, for example, Gorbachev's up-and-coming associate Alexander Yakovlev, who is now both a candidate member of the Politbureau and a secretary of the Central Committee, said at a high-level conference: "Today a sizeable stratum of perfectly literate, perfectly educated people has come into existence, who reject cultural activities which are even the least bit serious. They don't read anything except detective stories, they go to the cinema only to see sensationalist movies, and of all the musical forms, they like only hard rock. Their cultural aspirations are aggressive and narrow."

Thus, in addition to an economic debate and frank discussion of long taboo subjects like suicide, drug use, and rising crime rates, the media are also engaged in airing views on how to regenerate moral and cultural values and how to give people a healthy pride in their national heritage.

Naturally enough, these issues are being addressed not just by social scientists, but also - as Gorbachev has quickly mobilized all sections of the "creative intelligentsia" - by writers, moviemakers, and playwrights. The much increased cultural freedom has also led to decisions to publish long-suppressed works by writers such as Pasternak, Gumilev, Dudintsev, and Bek. Notably, though, the fierce ongoing struggle in the Kremlin between the liberal Gorbachev trend and the conservatives is reflected in the equally ferocious conflicts of cultural life. Among the literary-political publications, for example, those controlled by conservatives (e.g. Zvezda, Molodaya gvardiya, Moskva, Literaturnaya Rossiya) do battle with those edited by liberals (e.g. Druzhba narodov, Znamya, Neva, Novyi mir, Yunost).

Another development linked to socio-economic concerns is the much greater candor of the media regarding major accidents and natural disasters. While glasnost conspicuously failed the test in the immediate aftermath of the Chernobyl disaster, this very failure appears to have spurred the sharp improvements which have occurred in this area since last Spring.

Clearly, an important index of the level of glasnost in the Soviet Union at any particular time is the degree of official tolerance for the exercise by citizens of freedom of expression and freedom of association. These, of course, are key freedoms aspired to by many types of dissident.

Gorbachev conveyed his general approach to such matters at the January phenum: "If someone tries to use our extensive glasnost and the democratic process for his own selfish and anti-social purposes, for the purpose of blackening everything, will we really - with such a powerful Party, with such a patriotic people devoted to the ideas of socialism and to its Motherland - not be able to cope with the situation." As this and other parts of his speech make clear, he professes what one would expect a semi-populist communist to profess, namely that with the exception of a few malicious troublemakers, the people are sufficiently strongly behind the Party that agreement on tricky points can be reached through discussion and argument within the existing one-party system.

Like Khrushchev, therefore, Gorbachev is trying to recruit the "creative intelligentisia" to his ranks by, among other things, releasing from prison those people (90 to date) whose dissent and courage are widely admired in that social group, and by refraining from new arrests of intellectuals. In doing all this, he also gains important points in the West. His particularly notable concessions to Dr. Sakharov, especially in phoning him in Gorky prior to his release, went as far as the Literary Gazette commissioning an article from him. But the limits of Gorbachev's policy are suggested by the subsequent failure of the article to appear.

Other limits are indicated by the non-release, so far, of some 300 religious prisoners, and by the refusal, to date, to allow a significant amount of emigration by Jews, Volga Germans and Armenians, more than half a million of whom would like to leave. Also, in case the surprising decision to publicize the Kazakh riots of last December be regarded as typical, it should be stressed that deviant acts are not normally benefiting from glasnost. For example, a remarkable demonstration by 500 young Muscovites on February 22, protesting against the rise of violent, semi-fascist groups of youths known as "lyubery", went unreported in Soviet media. On the other hand the demonstration was accompanied by police, who made no attempt to disperse it, and provoked no incidents.

Although the Gorbachev leadership appears to be hostile to any notion of free emigration (probably because it would undermine the sense of social cohesion and unity it is trying to build up), it is noteworthy that the desire to generate pride in Soviet culture is so strong that it is leading to more freedom to travel, and more *glasnost*, in one unprecedented respect. Recent defectors like the theatre director Lyubimov and the dancer Baryshnikov are being invited to return home - not, as tradition would dictate, to serve 15 years in the Gulag, but to perform as world-famous stars.

For the present, at least, *glasnost*'s prospects seem good. Most of the controlling positions are now in the hands of people who favor it, such as the above mentioned Yakovlev, the head of the State Publishing Committee, Nenashev, the minister of culture, Zakharov, and the editor of the paper *Moscow News*, which is clearly licensed to lead the field in pushing back the frontiers of censorship - Egor Yakovlev. This team may even succeed in due course in storming a citadel which has long exasperated Gorbachev, namely the unreconstructed, *glasnost*-free local press, protected as it is in many parts of the country by Brezhevites who are still hanging on to their jobs.

A further barrier to greater *glasnost* - the jamming of foreign radio broadcasts - has already started to crumble. In December the Russian service of the B.B.C. was relieved of this jamming, and it would be surprising if this move were not soon extended to the Voice of America and other stations.

In the longer term, however, I would not be sanguine about glasnost's prospects. If Gorbachev is trying to square the circle by embarking on the democratization of the Soviet system, as he shows every sign of doing, then, in my view, he is unlikely to remain in power for many more years. Sooner or later, the nomenklatura will surely remove him. And in that case glasnost would be bound to suffer in the inevitable conservative reaction. For while it would probably not be reduced to the status quo ante, it is ultimately, we must remember, a commodity which can be doled out in greater or lesser quantity by the Kremlin. It is not an institution, let alone one with any autonomy.

What implications are there in all this, if any, for American foreign policy? The present seems to be an usually promising time for doing business with the Soviet Union. Gorbachev is stepping out on a highly risky domestic path and needs tangible foreign policy break-throughs to strengthen his position. He will bargain extremely hard, but he will also, in my view, be ready to make real concessions to get a deal. In these circumstances, deals may well be feasible in all the four main areas of arms control, bilateral relations, regional issues, and human rights. Issues of special relevance to this article which should be pursued include an end to the jamming of American broadcasts, concessions regarding the treatment of dissidents and emigration, and the expansion of cultural, academic and citizens' exchanges. As and when Gorbachev departs, the U.S. is likely to find it harder to obtain concessions in both these and other areas.

Chairman HOYER. The last member of our panel, Mr. Stone. Mr. Stone.

STATEMENT OF I.F. STONE, JOURNALIST

Mr. STONE. I was unable to perfect a statement on so complex a question that satisfied me. So I hope you will bear with my extemporized suggestions.

I think the cause of human freedom will be greatly furthered if we Americans are a little less self-righteous and a little more self-aware, and so I begin with the mites in our own eye.

It is a rather embarrassing period in which to judge Moscovite glasnost in Washington because had it not been for an accidental leak from Tehran to an offshore publication in Beirut, a worldwide arms smuggling and covert war with a network of foreign bank laundering operations being carried on from the basement of the White House for many months as part of administration policy, could have continued undetected. It is an indication of how much secrecy, how much the cancer of secrecy and secret organizations has grown in our society since the Second World War.

Second, I want to touch on selective anticommunism and selective outrage. We are examining the glasnost policy and the fine print, as we should, very carefully, but I have not read any editorials or columns in the American press lamenting the fact that here Gorbachev is moving in the right direction. It is being examined very closely, but Deng Xiaoping who has been backsliding in the last few months, arresting students and dissenters, and relapsing into a kind of Stalinist hysteria about the spiritual pollution of bourgeois liberalism is forgiven it all because he is our major Communist ally. And we say nothing of the fact that the missiles at the Strait of Hormuz that were sold to Iran by our client friend and quasi-ally China, may very easily precipitate us into war with Iran.

Now, I am not, of course, an expert on Russia and the Soviet Union, I can only speak as a newspaperman. I was there in my one and only visit in a very comparable period after the 20th Congress, 30 years ago, when Khrushchev and his secret speech opened the whole bag of horrors for history on the Stalin period and tried to encourage a more open society. I am sorry to say after that attacking the people on the Commission for their revision of the Criminal Code and other people, I was a little bit hopeful, but very much more skeptical.

Some years ago I wrote the first expose in the American press for the New York Review of Books on the abuse of psychiatry against dissenters in the Soviet Union. That was when Vladimir Bukovksy was still being held in the Union.

Having said that, I want to give a newspaperman's reaction to a recent Moscow conference. This was the big showpiece of the Gorbachev regime, intended to solidify his position of power by making him look like a big, international figure, which he is in many ways.

First of all it was very disappointing that while there was so much talk about glasnost, the press was barred from the proceedings. What openness there was, which was much more to the West than at home, there was very little reported about the meeting except for Gorbachev's own speech in the Soviet press, as far as I could see. The star attraction, Sakharov, the Tolstoy of our times, in many ways the greatest Russian of the century in my opinion, was given rather limited time and before only one Roundtable in the Soviet Union. It is a scandal that the text of his remarks was published only in Time magazine here in this country, and have not been reprinted in the Soviet press. The Literary Gazette asked him for an interview as soon as he arrived in Moscow and interviewed him and promised to let him see the text, but he never saw the text. The interview has still to be published.

The second thing was that the decrees under which political prisoners began to be released were kept secret in an era of glasnost. We have no way of knowing whether it was an amnesty, a pardon, or in some cases as we have learned from returned prisoners, a parole. Literally this means that you are out on parole, but if you are not a good boy and you dissent again, you will go right back in again.

Now, these secret decrees are an old scandal in Russian history. Nicholas I, tried to do something for the peasants but the bureaucracy that largely reflected the views of the landed gentry, and the great landowners did not approve, so the decrees were never made public. The peasants did not know what new rights they had. The intellectuals did not know what was going on, and the whole story is told in Bernard Parris's very fine history of Russia. Nicholas I, once said in despair, as Gorbachev could very well say in the tangles and troubles in which he has been involved, "I don't rule Russia," said the czar. "Ten thousand clerks rule Russia."

Now, the third thing is why are people released and pardoned? Why should they be pardoned for having exercised glasnost? And why is there no discussion by Gorbachev of anything but a few little side hints in the West and at Vienna of a very disturbing character that do not amount to much, of repealing the laws restricting freedom of speech, glasnost and intellectual freedom under which these people went to jail in the first place?

Dr. Koryagin, a very brave psychiatrist who spoke against the abuses of the psychiatric establishment in Russia, has been set free. There was some trouble about getting him out at the last minute, and Dr. Shasov was made to look very silly because he said he was out and he was not out. Dr. Koryagin suggested an investigation of these abuses.

Now, if you really want to cleanup, why not appoint Dr. Koryagin head of a commission to investigate the psychiatric insane asylums? You know, our Teddy Roosevelt once stigmatized radicals as the lunatic fringe, but the Soviet Union really took it seriously, literally, and dramatized it.

In preparation for the hearing, I read the full text of Grobachev's speech to the Central Committee in January and to the Peace Meeting, so-called, in Moscow and to the trade unions. While a lot of it is the standard, turgid Soviet rhetoric which has not been equalled for opacity, verbosity and dullness since the long reaches of medieval scholastic philosophy, there were also glimmers and lightening flashes of something else. I do not think it is possible to know the depth of Gorbachev's feelings about the dangers of nuclear war. I think it is very, very sincere, and it is spoken with great sincerity.

You cannot doubt his sincerity about the abuses within the Soviet system. And he has grown. When he first came in and you read what he had to say, he sounded like a cop's protege, like Chernenko's protege, disciplined, too much vodka. But he has been changing and growing with experience, and the speech to the trade unions had a lot of new things in it, even though the references to democracy were not as impressive in the context of the whole speech as they appeared to be in the news reports.

But I am struck by the fact that in none of those speeches did Gorbachev mention freedom of speech, press and assembly. Now, it is in the 1936 Stalin constitution. It is in the 1977 Brezhnev constitution. Why doesn't he mention it?

He is asking for the whistleblowers to speak up, and how do you encourage people to speak up when these laws are still on the books, and one of the rights promised by these constitutions remains a farce and a dead letter. Why doesn't he begin to speak about this if he wants people to speak?

You know, if you had to deal with the history of Russia in one sentence, you would say it was a great empire that shifted from a reactionary autocracy to a revolutionary autocracy, but deeply and fundamentally hostile to freedom of thought and expression. That is a hard thing to get out of. The Russians have the right to some compassion, patience and kindness in the evaluation of these changes.

It would be wonderful and a real signal, a change if Gorbachev would say to the Helsinki watchers who have been released, "I am going to allow you to reconstitute this committee. You are a valuable information source. You let me know about things that are happening that I don't know."

Every dictator is the prisoner of his own system and very hardput to get information. That is the great function of a free press.

You know, this business about the abuses of the bureaucracy is a very old story. Lenin was very much upset about it the year or so before he died. Again I am speaking as a newspaperman. Within 8 months of the revolution, he had support of not only the opposition party press, but also of the fellow traveler, notably the newspaper of Maxim Gorky, the greatest fellow traveler and sympathizer of the Bolsheviks. They could not even stand criticism from him.

When they got worried a few years ago about bureaucratic abuses, he had the option of opening up the press. He did not have to have a capitalist press, but he could have permitted a lot more freedom than there was. Instead, in typical Russian fashion, he put one more layer on the bureaucracy, the so-called Rupkruhm, the workers' and people's inspectorates. It was still, as Gorbachev said in a memorable phrase, dancing cheek to cheek with the rest of the bureaucracy. It did not amount to a damn. It was still depending on the bureaucracy to control the bureaucracy in the old czarist fashion.

Now, you know, one way to reform a system, somebody asked how can Gorbachev do it? Well, there is a good parallel in Pope John XXIII. How come after so many centuries a very similar, hierarchical and authoritarian organization was able to undergo change. The Politburo is very much like the Vatican, in that the party claims infallibility. But how could it change? One great Pope

John XXIII opened up the forces beneath the surface in that ancient institution, that reinvigorated it and brought it up to date. Something like that can happen in the Soviet Union.

History is a burden on all of us. We are determined by it, but we are also free. It is not fatalistic, and men have a will of their own and a duty to combat the excesses and wrongs of the past, and there can be change, and we ought to welcome it.

We ought to welcome it for two reasons. One is, you know, Oppenheimer once spoke to the two Super Powers as to cockroaches, or did he use that unfriendly a term? In a bottle.

Mr. **Reddaway**. Scorpions.

Mr. **Stone**. Scorpions. He might have said cockroaches.

I would say that we and the Soviet Union have been caught in the marriage of hate. A marriage of hate is a dreadful thing. It brings out the worst in both sides. It gives the hard-liners an excuse for all kinds of excesses here, and it has given us attacks of "Red Phobia" resulting in repression like the Witch Hunt of the 1950's which trampled on cherished American traditions, the Constitution and on the first amendment. A freer Russia will help to free us of our neuroses and psychoses, psychoses in which there is a lot of vested interest in our country. This whole arms race depends upon the perpetuation of paranoid views about the Soviet Union, and there is a rightwing fringe in our country that is really as hard-line, if they could get away with it, as the hard-line fringe in the Soviet Union.

And, second——

Chairman **Hoyer**. Mr. Stone, could you make this your last point because some of us have to leave, and we would like to get to the questions.

Mr. **Stone**. This is my last point, and it is very important.

If we do not come to an arms agreement very soon, if we go into space war, the reaction time to strike at an ICBM on the other side in the BUS phase which is now about 5 minutes will soon be 50 seconds. That leaves no time for Congress to declare war, and it leaves no time to get the President out of bed or the Politburo out of bed. Everything will now be done by computers.

We know from long experience how many errors there can be. Those errors may cost the life of human civilization. If we get into this period where everything is on such a tight trigger, there is going to be an increase in paranoia on both sides, and less and less glasnost, and less and less civil liberty.

So I hope for the best from Gorbachev, and I hope we can come to terms with him. It might easily be our last chance in a long time.

Chairman **Hoyer**. Thank you very much, Mr. Stone. We appreciate your contributions.

Mr. Ambassador, in starting the questions, I would like to go back to you, but have others comment on it as well. The subject of the hearing is glasnost; and what it means and where we are going. I think one of the interesting things that has permeated the discussions here is, assuming the sincerity of Mr. Gorbachev, whether he can in fact be successful and whether, in Mr. Goldman's terms, he can last.

Would you comment on that and amplify your thoughts? You have been there. You have seen the first stages of this effort, and I would very much like to and I know the Commission would like to hear your views on its viability.

Ambassador **Hartman**. It is very hard to say based on the short period of time we have had to observe these phenomena. Clearly, Mr. Gorbachev is a new generation. He is trying some new techniques.

My own view is contrary, I think, to some in this country who look at him and see the new techniques and think that the basic ideas have changed. He is a man that has come up through the system. He believes that there must be a dominance of the Communist Party in the system that governs the Soviet Union. That means central control and central authority.

He is faced with the problem, however, and I am not sure he recognizes it yet, that the only way to solve his economic problems, the only way to make the growth rates come back to a level that is acceptable in terms of what is seen as a competition among the major nations of the world, is to allow some power to shift from the center; allow it to shift to the managers of enterprises; allow it to shift to regions.

I do not believe that Mr. Gorbachev is a reformer in the sense that he wishes to depart from the basic authoritarian principles and centralized control inherent in Marxist/Leninist philosophy. Therefore, I think he is going to have a hard time, and when people say 3, 4 years from now, I think what they mean is that several things can happen.

First, he will excite a lot of expectations and people are going to come to him and say, "Well, these expectations have not been met."

Second, he can also upset the people who have real power, that is, the people at the head of the party. These are the people who threw Khrushchev out when they felt that he had gone too far.

Third, it seems to me that in a sense we do not understand the country if we do not understand that the mass of the Soviet people are very conservative. They are people who feel that change in the past has usually meant that they got it in the neck; that while these intellectuals can philosophize in Moscow and talk about all of these great new things that they are going to bring, the sympathy of the population is basically with a conservative course. They are intensely patriotic. They feel that they are surrounded by hostile forces, and indeed, their history is full of that.

So Gorbachev's problem is how you can bring these various forces together and do what he basically must do, which is to modernize that society, and to modernize it means to go against many of the preconceptions of the mass. It means going against the preconceptions of the party stalwarts if he really is going to have the kinds of changes that will make a difference. It also means taking risks with the outside world.

We have not said anything about what glasnost may mean, for example, in Eastern Europe. Why are the Czechs and the East Germans rather cool to what is going on in the Soviet Union these days? Well, it seems to me it is quite clear. The Czech leadership is the leadership which experienced the Prague Spring, and under pressure from the great Soviet neighbor, they suppressed a freedom movement, a movement that was attempting, in fact, to accomplish many of the objectives Mr. Gorbachev says he wants to accomplish.

The Czech experience and the experience in practically every other Eastern European country is that once you start a process which begins to open up a Communist system, it is very difficult to control.

Chairman HOYER. Mr. Ambassador, could I interject? I had the opportunity of meeting with certain government officials of Hungary relatively recently, such as Mr. Varkoni, the Foreign Minister, and as well I met with Sherritt from Poland, who expressed to Dante Fascell and others, 2 weeks ago, an enthusiasm for glasnost. Would those two be exceptions to your observations?

Ambassador HARTMAN. No, not exceptions at all. It seems to me that the Hungarians and the Poles, both want to encourage these trends in the Soviet Union because they realize that the limits of what they can do in their own country are governed really by what is happening in the Soviet Union.

Chairman HOYER. When I said exceptions I meant as to the Czechoslovakians, perhaps the Romanians, and the Bulgarians who have a different perspective.

Ambassador HARTMAN. That is right, but we have got to remember that both in Hungary and in Poland those Governments have in the past had difficulties in controlling the effects of this kind of a change in policy. There are conservative forces in both countries who feel that any movement in this direction will probably end in trouble and who would like to resist it. They have looked at the experience of the last 20 years, and they have lots of proof of that.

Chairman HOYER. I have many other questions, but we have five distinguished U.S. Senators here, and I hasten to turn to them at this point.

Senator DeConcini.

Cochairman DECONCINI. Mr. Ambassador, hasn't the Soviet system already gone through some economic changes on the private side or civilian side by permitting a greater amount of freelancing in the service industries and even in the agricultural sector in terms of having some things available to market? You have lived there, and perhaps I am mistaken by my three brief visits about some openness that seems to be occurring even before Mr. Gorbachev got there, and though it is not admitted as openness until recently, can you comment on whether my perception and observations are inaccurate, or is it just so miniscule that it does not make any difference?

Ambassador HARTMAN. Well, I think there are two things you ought to look at. Before the current regime, that is, during the Brezhnev years, there was much private activity. It was parallel activity and quite illegal, and it often went unprosecuted.

Cochairman DECONCINI. But it was tolerated, right?

Ambassador HARTMAN. It was tolerated through bribes and other things that are now being attacked by Mr. Gorbachev. But, in fact, it made the system work. People went outside the legal boundaries in order to have something that actually worked.

What you are seeing now is a lot of talk about privitization in the service sector and whatnot, but when you look at the actual law that is coming out, which forbids the hiring of labor; in other words, the conservatives got hold of this and went back to basic principles in Marxism and Leninism and said, "Well, you know, if you are going to have this activity, you should not be allowed to hire anyone."

Cochairman DECONCINI. Excuse me, Mr. Ambassador. Correct me. They have not changed their actual system where it is no longer illegal for someone in the service business to have a private part of his day so that they can deal with their own customers provided that they meet the quota that the state has set. That is not the case?

Ambassador HARTMAN. No. They have talked about this system. They have issued some regulations, but basically this is being left now to local authorities to implement, and there is no private restaurant, for example, in Moscow. This will be one of my tests.

Cochairman DECONCINI. What about the private service of automobiles, of appliances, business machinery?

Ambassador HARTMAN. People are beginning to talk about organizing these things which have in the past existed, and people have paid on the sly to get their cars fixed. They have paid on the sly to get their apartments painted.

So what is happening is some of these things are now coming in to the legal sector.

Cochairman DECONCINI. But it is not massive or widespread?

Ambassador HARTMAN. It is not massive, and it is subject to quite a bit of opposition.

Cochairman DECONCINI. Thank you.

Professor GOLDMAN. May I add something on that to supplement what the Ambassador said?

The law goes into effect May 1. Indicative of the difficulty it is having, the law was supposed to have gone into effect last year. The conservatives, as the Ambassador has indicated, have stressed that there should be a crackdown on the illegal things before the law would be announced. The law was supposed to have been announced much earlier. It was not.

Second of all, the law says that you cannot hire anyone, even if it is approved by local authorities.

Third, the law says that you can only do it if you are a pensioner, if you are a student, if you do it after hours. You cannot quit a job to do it.

So it is still very limited.

Cochairman DECONCINI. Let me pursue that. Does the law also say, because I am not familiar with the law, only reports of it; does the law also say that an employee of the state who is a painter or an automobile mechanic or computer mechanic cannot freelance, and is it still a violation of the law for that person after his normal 8- or 10-hour day to go and do work for some neighbor or some coop or something like that and be paid for it?

Professor GOLDMAN. The law says you can do it after hours. You are right, but you still cannot hire anyone. In Hungary it is a much more elaborate kind of thing.

Cochairman DECONCINI. So you mean the person that would hire the person after hours would be violating the law?

Professor GOLDMAN. That is right. You cannot hire anybody. You have to do it freelance.

Cochairman DECONCINI. So, in essence, they have not opened up that system.

Professor GOLDMAN. You have to do it freelance or form a cooperative or your family, but you cannot hire anyone. In Hungary you can. In China you can hire 10 people. In Germany you can even hire 10 people.

Cochairman DECONCINI. Thank you.

Mr. STONE. Could I supplement that with a question to the Ambassador? It was my impression that in the Soviet Union——

Chairman HOYER. Mr. Stone, I was going to have the Senators ask the questions first, if I can, because they have tight schedules, if you will.

Senator D'Amato.

Senator D'AMATO. Mr. Chairman, let me say this has been probably the most interesting panel that I have ever heard discuss what is taking place in the Soviet Union, and particularly their views on Mr. Gorbachev. I have never before heard it expressed that they feel that Gorbachev has a limited time to rule, and indeed, to quote Professor Goldman, only 4 years time, I think. I do not know if that is 4 years starting from when he took office or if you give him 4 years starting now or only another 2. Ambassador Hartman's and Mr. Reddaway's views on this issue are very interesting. Absolutely intriguing.

Let me ask you: Gorbachev understands this, obviously. If he sees his position deteriorating, isn't there a chance then that he will move very decisively in another direction? Might he reinforce the party structure, supporting those who are there, to keep the helm?

Professor GOLDMAN. Well, I think your analysis is a correct one. Again, there is a parallel with China because you would think that Gorbachev would have drawn some conclusions from what happened to Deng Xiaoping, who seems to be cutting back to some extent. But what is so remarkable about Gorbachev is that after the events in China, he kept moving ahead, doing one thing after another. It is almost as if he is a masochist.

He has to realize that he is stepping on toes. There is an enormous parallel to what happened with Khrushchev. He is antagonizing almost every segment of the society except the intellectuals, and the intellectuals do not carry much impact in the Soviet Union.

He has upset the workers. There are shifts, and the workers have got to work more shifts now. He has, in effect, lowered their wages because he has instituted quality controls which say if you do not produce good quality work, you do not get paid. There are reports that in some cases wages have fallen 30 percent. There was at least one riot that was provoked, probably others.

He has made it more difficult for them to get vodka, and they have not improved their housing or their food, and if you look at the bureaucrats, he has threatened their very existence. He has threatened the military because there are reports that he has threatened to cut back military expenditures.

You know, I can tell you how I would react if the president of Wellesley took away my tenure. I would try to do what I could to get at her, and in exactly the same way, he has done this with all of the bureaucrats, both government and party. So he has no base of support.

I think, however, there is a good chance that he may suddenly slow down if he feels that he is going to be overthrown, but reading that thing that I mentioned when he spoke in Riga, he says he has got really 2 or 3 years to show something.

The difficulty is everybody looks at him and says, "What have you done for us?" But he has only been in power 2 years, and it is very hard to get any kind of material benefit to the workers, to the general populous, in such a short time. As the Ambassador said, "it is basically a very conservative society."

Senator D'AMATO. To followup on that, what has he done for them? If you look at the manner in which he is proceeding, will he in the final analysis be able to produce any benefits that will then secure a base for him? It is hard to imagine that can take place. Ambassador?

Ambassador HARTMAN. Well, you have got to look at the prospects that have been seen by people in that country. People are not unhappy. Although they are at a very low level of consumption, even compared with the Eastern European countries, and that must annoy some of the travelers from the Soviet Union to Eastern Europe. They see Eastern Europeans living on a better standard of living—the mass of the people—than they are in the Soviet Union. But basically I do not think that the Soviet people are unhappy.

They have a place to live. They look back on the war period, the terrible times, and they feel it is better now. Their food deliveries have not been good, and there have been some difficulties, I think, over the past few years, but never to the point or at least only once that I can remember where there were riots. But people grumble, but basically their expectations are rather low.

So if he can produce, and of course, weather would help as it did this year, better harvest, more plentiful food supplies, better designed clothing, more apartments, I think you would find that the mass of the people would be very pleased, and there would be very little reaction.

It is much harder to please the Eastern Europeans because they have known a different scale of living.

Senator D'AMATO. One final question. We frequently hear it said that Gorbachev needs a nuclear agreement to take intermediate range missiles out of Europe. How does this fit in, that assumption that Gorbachev needs this, into the overall picture? Is that just our daydreaming? Is it a fact? Would it be an accomplishment? Is it something that would strengthen his power base?

Ambassador HARTMAN. Any Soviet leader who can show successes in the international field builds a kind of base of support in his own country. It is not unlike the situation in our country. He wants a period of calm. A period of calm can come, it seems to me, if he can show that there are agreements that have been reached, that, therefore, the tensions can be reduced with the United States.

You know, the tension situation is something that the Soviets have manipulated. They tend to say at different points in time, you know, the situation has never been worse; that we are on the verge of war, and so forth, when it suits their negotiating posture, when it can put pressure, for example, on the European public or on our own public.

Right now what we are seeing is a desire on their part for a period of calm. Therefore, we are seeing some serious negotiations, and I think we have a chance of achieving perhaps modest agreements, but some progress particularly in the nuclear arms field.

Senator D'AMATO. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

Chairman HOYER. Senator Heinz.

Senator HEINZ. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

First of all, Ambassador Hartman, you did not express an opinion as to whether Mr. Gorbachev is going to last 4 years or not, I do not think. Can I get you on record? Is he going to make it or not?

Ambassador HARTMAN. No, I think that is the sort of thing I should not make a stab at. All I can say is——

Senator HEINZ. You are a fine Ambassador. You qualify for reappointment.

Ambassador HARTMAN. No, I am not being reappointed. Let me tell you what I think will happen.

Senator HEINZ. I did not say you were. I just said you are qualified.

Ambassador HARTMAN. Let me tell you what I think will happen though, which I have not said. It seems to me that 3 or 4 years from now, the engineers, the sort of modernizers in the society, the people who are trying to make something concrete, are going to come to the political leadership and say, you know, "We really have not made enough change so that we can efficiently produce what we have to produce." They will suggest changes that will go against doctrine, and that is going to lead to a fight, and I am a bit pessimistic on the result of that fight.

It seems to me the doctrine fellows will win.

Senator HEINZ. Let me ask very specifically because of the interest in this group in human rights and in emigration, to you, Ambassador Hartman, a very specific question. You were in Moscow for about 5½ years, and you were there part of Brezhnev, Chernenko, Andropov. How many emigration cases did you pursue through our Embassy there during that period, and how did they work out, and how many did you have the opportunity to pursue since the ascension of Gorbachev and how did they work out? Was there any difference?

Ambassador HARTMAN. Well, all I can say on the cases is we have all through this period presented lists to the Soviet Union of cases where the United States had a direct interest, that is, divided families, divided spouses, dual nationals, and then we presented cases which the Soviets always maintained we had no particular right to present to them, namely, the cases of Jewish emigration where the application was to emigrate to Israel, and where there was no direct family interest in the United States.

We presented all of those. I would say until very recently, there was a general response that it was none of our business. They would talk to us a bit about divided spouses and divided families.

Recently the tactic has changed completely. They have set up a department in the Foreign Office whose sole job is to talk to us about this and other human rights matters. They have taken the matter much more seriously, and we have seen some progress. It is, I think, small progress to date, and we have heard from Professor Reddaway some of the statistics, but they have listened.

I have sat in on discussions with the Secretary of State and with the President in which they very seriously hear us out. They do not take the kind of cold response that we used to get from Mr. Gromeko which said, "I am not listening," in effect.

Senator HEINZ. But nonetheless, as Mr. Reddaway pointed out, there have been, at least in terms of prisoner releases, no religious prisoners released, at least when he testified here.

Ambassador HARTMAN. I do not think he said "no." He said "very few."

Senator HEINZ. Almost none.

Ambassador HARTMAN. For example, there have been a couple of the Hebrew teachers, Mr. Begun, for example, who has been released. I would count that as a religious case even though that is not why he was imprisoned.

Senator HEINZ. I would agree.

Let me ask you this. In Pennsylvania, I have a number of children of prominent refuseniks. Probably the most prominent is Alexander Slepak, whose father is Vladimir Slepak who is a student at the Temple University Medical School. His father has been 17 years denied, since 1970, emigration. The reason the Soviet Union gives, they gave at one time, is a concern about classified information despite the fact he had worked on television research.

How can we take advantage of glasnost to win the release of a man who has not been close to a secret for in excess of 17, maybe closer to 20 years, who is divided from his children, and who has shown great courage in speaking out against human rights abuses in the Soviet Union?

Ambassador HARTMAN. Well, it seems to me we have to continue to press. We have to continue to speak out publicly about these cases. Mr. Slepak is a friend of mine. He has visited me in the Embassy many, many times. It makes no sense.

I have heard Mr. Gorbachev say that after 10 years, there should be no question about security being a barrier to emigration, and yet when Inna Meiman was dying and here in this country with cancer, her husband, who had not had anything at all to do with classified work for 30 years, was not permitted to join her. There are many cases like this.

It seems to me the outside world has to continue to express its outrage and disappointment that the Soviet Union is not meeting its obligations, obligations which they freely accepted under the Helsinki Agreements.

Senator HEINZ. Does either Professor Goldman or Mr. Reddaway or Mr. Stone wish to comment on my last question?

Professor GOLDMAN. I think I would agree with the Ambassador. I am, frankly, I must say optimistic. I think that as part of this procedure, it is true that a new law was passed which restricted the definition of who could emigrate, but if you look at what Gorbachev has been doing, he has not been introducing laws which do not have meaning. He is not introducing laws just for show, and if he can succeed in doing some of these things, I would expect continued liberalization.

There has been some slight increase in the numbers who have been allowed to emigrate. He is responding. You know, if you liken the Chinese reforms to turning a tanker around; in the case of the Soviets, it is more like turning a pier around which is firmly embedded in 70 years of experience. But the very fact that these political prisoners have been released at all within a very short period of time leads me to be optimistic. I do think that if we can continue this, if there should be another summit meeting, for example, before each summit meeting and thereafter there are a few more people let go. I would think that the way things are moving, there is more hope than I would have had last year at this time.

Mr. REDDAWAY. I would just like to add that I think I agree with the Ambassador and Mr. Goldman that where cases are turned into high profile cases, and Mr. Slepak's case is obviously very suitable for that, there is a good chance of success by the methods that Mr. Hartman says: "keep on hammering away, publicity, pressure by governments."

Because part of the pattern of the last few months at any rate, but roughly speaking the last year, has been that Mr. Gorbachev wants to solve those cases which cause the most friction with foreign governments, and I think Mr. Slepak's case could easily be made into such a case; however, I think the big test on emigration will come precisely because of what Marshall Goldman said. Gorbachev tends to be serious about new laws, and the new law on emigration or the modifications to the old law are extremely restrictive.

So if you look at the bigger picture and look at the hundreds of thousands of would-be emigrants, and it is hundreds of thousands, then I think there is a much bigger question mark because if he is serious about this new law, then those people are not going to get out. It is only going to be a tiny percentage of them that get out, and that represents a much bigger problem because it cannot just be ridden over very easily politically if Gorbachev decides he wants to do it. It is just not that easy when he has only just introduced this new law.

Now, on that score it seems to me you need a sort of longer-term approach to try to bring home to the Soviets the fact that this new law is not in tune with the Soviet commitments under the Helsinki Final Act and is not in tune with the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and that is going to be a big job.

It is always possible, of course, that we'll have a repeat of the case in which the Soviets introduced a new law in 1972 imposing an education tax on would-be emigrants, and when this caused an uproar, they did not repeal the law. They just let it be known quietly that they would not apply it anymore. Well, possibly if we have enough pressure in the case of this modification to the law on emigration, they might do the same thing in that case, in which case, of course, I would be much more optimistic.

But I think it is a very big question, because to allow large scale emigration over a period of years, I think, goes against the spirit of what Gorbachev is trying to do. He is trying to create an organic society where all of the different sections of society are genuinely enthusiastic about reform, about Gorbachev's program, and he realizes it may not be easy to make them enthusiastic right away, but he hopes in 2 or 3 years, as he said in Riga, that the fruits will start to come through, and that that really would make people enthusiastic.

To have the constant drain, to have the door open for people to get out, does not fit very well with that general thrust. So I do not think that we should kid ourselves that that issue is going to be an easy one. It is going to need a tremendous amount of political pressure.

Chairman HOYER. Professor Goldman, do you want to comment briefly on that?

Professor GOLDMAN. Yes. May I just try to be brief about that?

I think I agree with Peter Reddaway. However, I would say one thing. The ball may be tossed back strangely enough into the court of the Senate, in particular, or in the Congress generally, the House and Senate. There was a statement the other day that this year we will see as many as 10,000 Jewish refuseniks allowed out, close family members as party definition. There was a statement by a soviet official to that effect, and there have been lots of hints.

If that is the case, and that may be wishful thinking, but if that is the case, that still is not up to the number of 51,000 Jewish refuseniks who were let out in 1979. Nonetheless that may still provide a test for us.

The Soviets have often said, "All you Americans know how to do is to give us the stick." We should ask ourselves the question, at some point, if they are responsive and if there is any of this that is sincere, are we prepared to say that maybe there should be some carrots for them as well? Because indeed as the Soviet law, as Peter indicates, is a closely restricted law. If we want to broaden the law, they may expect something from us, and the question is: what are we prepared to do to show we appreciate their efforts? And that is going to fall right back in your court.

Mr. REDDAWAY. There is a carrot built into American legislation through Jackson-Vanik. They will get the most-favored-nation's status.

Professor GOLDMAN. That is the question that I was trying to be too subtle about.

Chairman HOYER. Thank you, Senator.

Senator McClure.

Senator MCCLURE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I want to explore just a little bit more than you have done in your statements what the purpose is and where this may lead us. Certainly no policy is unambiguous, but has more than one reason and multiple areas of concern.

But is it more directed towards internal policy and restructuring or more directed towards external perceptions and, therefore, affecting foreign relations more?

Ambassador Hartman.

Ambassador HARTMAN. I believe it is directly mainly at the internal situation. I think the problems that are faced by Mr. Gorbachev are enormous. As I said, the masses are almost in concrete. To move those people around, he has got to mobilize the intellectuals. He has got to do something to regenerate the party, and opening up is one way to do that.

It has its drawbacks and it has its dangers for him as a leader.

Senator McCLURE. But it is more focused internally than it is externally?

Ambassador HARTMAN. Absolutely, absolutely.

Senator McCLURE. Professor Goldman.

Professor GOLDMAN. I think I would agree with Ambassador Hartman. Most of these things are being done inside. If you look at what has been going on, they take some of their best minds and they send them to Siberia; they send them to Gorky; they let them come to the United States; or they put them in prison. Gorbachev is saying, "That is crazy. Let's reverse that. Let's use the best minds for our work," because as you have heard, his main goal is economic development, innovation, technology, and you are really alienating some of the best people.

So he is focusing mainly at home, but there is no doubt that there is also an international impact. When he let Sakharov out, for example, initially there was not much publicity inside the country, but now Sakharov has appeared on television inside the Kremlin listening to Gorbachev. That has to be a shellshock experience for some of the conservative hard-liners inside the Soviet Union, but for the most part, it is, I think, a domestic policy.

Senator McCLURE. Mr. Reddaway.

Mr. REDDAWAY. I would agree with that. Clearly, however, even if your main motivation relates to internal affairs, if you have a Foreign Service that is worth its salt, they try to take advantage of whatever is being done internally and put it to the best use externally, and I think that is what they have been doing with considerable skill, much greater skill than we have been used to from the Soviets in the past.

Possibly this is the moment to say, perhaps we have not emphasized enough, what I feel as a motivation underlying Mr. Gorbachev personally and some of his colleagues, which is a sort of Soviet patriotism. This is what motivates him, a feeling that the Soviet Union has been humiliated as a country by its own inefficiency, through the rulers allowing the system to run down, to become inert, and I think part of the motivation is wanting to reverse that, and that means that the central thrust is internal. They are prepared to run risks in order to try to make progress.

Senator McCLURE. Mr. Stone, do you think it is mostly internal or mostly external?

Mr. STONE. Well, I agree with the rest of the panel. I just wanted to raise another point about glasnost. The Soviet Union has got to move into the computer age, and they are scared to death even of the Xerox machine.

Mr. McCLURE. As well they should be. Computers have to terrify them.

Mr. STONE. If you have computers and modems, that is a rival network of communication to the official press, and a mere Siamese dot can have wide circulation. So they have got to choose. I think the computer challenge and the necessity for the computer will be a very strong factor in pushing toward a more open and less fearful society.

Senator McCLURE. Let me return a moment to this question. Indeed, if it is more internal, and I gather that from your papers and your remarks, that you are really looking at not only economic and political revitalization. There is also an element, is there not, in the openness to criticism a means by which they can gain control of people within the party apparatus that are not really huing to the Moscow line? I think I detected that among three of your statements.

This again, while we might applaud the openness, there really is not any reason for us to take much heart in either the motive or the result of that because it may, indeed, make it more difficult for people to run autonomous operations. They do not have, as he stated, and I think two of you made reference to this statement; they do not have an opposition party, and therefore, they need an opposition press.

We have opposition parties. I am not sure how badly we need an opposition press here, but that is another story.

But if it is really true that this is focused primarily internally, how much real heart should we take in terms of fundamental change with respect to the relationship to the rest of the world? Certainly they want better relations in order to achieve objectives, which are important to them.

Professor Goldman, near the end of your statement you indicated that, well, he really needs to have a good arms control agreement. Well, what if that arms control agreement really does have some verification, if it really does open up the system to a little verification by the West? Are the hard-liners, the conservatives in his country going to applaud that? Perhaps an arms control agreement could exacerbate his problems.

Professor GOLDMAN. I think your point is a very good one. I think that is part of his dilemma. It is very instructive to look at China to see exactly the difference between Deng Xiaoping and Gorbachev. As I mentioned earlier, Deng Xiaoping is having problems.

Deng Xiaoping was able to attain massive public support from 80 percent of the population because one of the first things he did was to move on agrarian reforms, and the peasants suddenly became very wealthy after previously having been under enormous economic pressure.

Gorbachev does not have anything comparable. He has, therefore, got to look to find something, some kind of signal, some kind of sign that his crazy ideas have brought some improvement in Soviet life, and as Peter Reddaway mentioned, that might very well be an arms agreement because that would make possible a reduction in military expenditures.

Senator MCCLURE. But is that seen strongly enough by the populous of the Soviet Union to have that kind of political benefit?

Professor GOLDMAN. That will not solve all of the problems, but at least he will have something to point to, whereas now he has nothing to point to. But you are right. It would at the same time excite and anger the military industrial complex inside the Soviet Union. What is this nonsense, inspectors coming through our factory? You know, we have similar concerns.

There are already reports that have been circulating that Soviet generals as well as some ordinary Soviet citizens have asked Gorbachev, "What about your being too soft on the United States?" He will go out into a public meeting, as he did on the street in Latvia, and somebody will say to him, "What about this moratorium? Aren't you being too soft? Aren't the Americans taking advantage of you?"

If, after all, even we are seeing suddenly there are people who are raising questions. What would the reduction of INF mean to us?

Senator McCLURE. Ambassador Hartman?

Ambassador HARTMAN. Well, I think there will be external effects of such a policy, and frankly, I think we ought to welcome them.

Senator McCLURE. We ought to take advantage of it as much as we can, but that it is not its primary thrust.

Ambassador HARTMAN. That is right. If this opens up Soviet society even a little bit; that little bit, it seems to me, is an advantage to us. The great danger in the past is that they have been completely closed, and they have really paid no price for that. Now they see that they are paying a price for that kind of a closed society in terms of efficiency in their economy, and we want to see that kind of clash have an effect. The effect will be to open it up even more.

Senator McCLURE. Well, one of you indicated that one of the evidences of openness is less jamming of the broadcasts. Another one said you do not see any evidence that jamming has been decreased. Which is the case?

Ambassador HARTMAN. Peter, I think, spoke to that.

Mr. REDDAWAY. I did not catch anybody denying what I said about the removal of jamming from BBC.

Senator McCLURE. Well, I read Ambassador Hartman's statement, and while he did not disagree with what you said, he made a statement that was different than the one you made.

Ambassador HARTMAN. There has been no change in the jamming of American stations or of the private stations operating out of Munich, and indeed, the stations operating of the German Government and the French Government in Russian language or in the language of any of the republics continue to be jammed. Our English language broadcasts are not jammed.

Mr. REDDAWAY. If I could just add, I very much agree with what the Ambassador said about the present situation presenting opportunities in bilateral relations. One that has not been mentioned, apart from jamming which is an important point, is the question of exchanges. I did touch on this in my written statement. That seems to be an area where both sides can derive advantage from an increase in exchanges.

Senator McCLURE. Do we see any evidence that the exchanges are more open today than they were 2 years ago?

Mr. REDDAWAY. Yes.

Senator McCLURE. They are more open to more of our people going there. Is it a more open process with respect to their people and who they may be that can come here?

Mr. REDDAWAY. It is somewhat more open. It is nowhere near as much more open as we would like, and the President's initiative on cultural exchanges is pushing as hard as it can to improve the situation here. There has been very notable progress in the last year as regards the number and type of Soviets coming here, but certainly there is an enormous way to go. There is still much too narrow a group of Soviets who come here, and the numbers, in particular, are still very small in relation to what we would like to see.

Professor GOLDMAN. I can give you one concrete example. We at Harvard have been inviting an economist from Lithuania to visit us for the last 4 years. We knew he was not getting our invitation. Suddenly this year he says, "I have gotten your invitation," and I just received a phone call 2 weeks ago. He is coming. He will be here in the fall.

That is anecdotal, but that is certainly a symbol of a more relaxed attitude.

Senator MCCLURE. Mr. Chairman, could I ask just one more question?

And that is in regard to the exchanges, I had the leader of a student exchange who took a group of high school students from the United States to the Soviet Union, who was shocked at the lack of preparation on our side, the naivete, if you will, the lack of preparation or understanding of American students going there, and the vulnerability to the organized response that they got inside the Soviet Union, as contrasted to the very great control that they have over the groups that come from their country and the way in which they are indoctrinated prior to their getting out of their country to come here.

Is there something we should do in connection with expanded exchanges to make certain that the groups traveling from the United States understand what it is they are going to see, what kind of system it is they are observing, what kind of questions they ought to ask, what they ought to look for, what they should expect in terms of the propaganda efforts that will be obviously made to vulnerable groups?

Ambassador HARTMAN. Senator, I think you are right, and I used to see evidences of this in the people who would come to visit me. There is a great lack of preparation on the part of people who come over and, therefore, a vulnerability. I think it is a very short-term benefit for the Soviet Union, on the other hand, because I think people see with their own eyes many things that they maybe do not prepare for, and they come back with those impressions.

But we have a group in the Government now who are taking much more of a hand in helping to prepare these groups. Under Mr. Rhinesmith and the USIA there is a group that really are keeping in touch with all of the private groups that go to the Soviet Union and giving them material and urging them to get themselves better prepared and better briefed.

Senator MCCLURE. Mr. Stone.

Mr. STONE. I think that one way to prepare people better for a trip to the Soviet Union is to improve the teaching of American history, what we used to call civics when I was a boy. A lot of kids in high school get very little history and acquire very little knowledge of the foundation of their country, its heritage and the writing of the Constitution and what it means. It is a very unhistorical generation and very poorly trained in a knowledge of the free institutions of our country.

Professor GOLDMAN. Senator, one of the things we are trying to do is provide courses and training for high school teachers. I think that we really do not only not study American history as we should, but we do not study much about the Soviet Union. So actually with some government help that has been coming out of the Department of Education, we have been putting on some seminars and preparing textbook materials for high school teachers just on this. That is not going to take care of the whole country, obviously, but at least it is a start.

Senator McClure. Thank you very much.

Chairman Hoyer. Thank you, Senator.

Mr. Richardson.

Representative Richardson. Thank you.

Chairman Hoyer. A new member of the Commission, Congressman Richardson from New Mexico.

Representative Richardson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I apologize for being late, and I hope these questions that I am going to ask have not been covered before.

One question I would have would be to the panel and the second would be to Ambassador Hartman.

The question that I would like to ask the panel is assuming that your view is that glasnost or the successful development of glasnost is in the U.S. interest, what specifically could the United States do to encourage glasnost in the trade, in the scientific exchange and in the educational exchange areas?

And in the context of the trade, I wondered if you felt the timing might be right or not as to whether the Jackson-Vanik provision might be tightened up, in other words, made more restrictive than it currently is.

Professor Goldman. That is a very hard question. Let me begin with the first part. I think I am not sure that it is something that we can affect from the outside all that much. This is initially at least an internal process.

To the extent that we can do anything, I think one of the things we have to look at is when we see things improving, is give credit to the Soviets for that sometimes in the past we have been reluctant to do. It is like priming a pump in some sense. My feeling is if good things are happening, we should be encouraging.

I am very pleased, for example, that Secretary of State Shultz is going to the Soviet Union. He is going obviously for arms control reasons, but many of the other things that have been on the agenda in the past, including Sakharov, including Shcharansky have been taken care of, and I think we should give the Soviets credit for that.

I have some conservative friends who will tell me and former emigrants who will tell me, you know, "This is still a bad system. Don't give people credit for doing the decent thing. They should have been doing it a long time ago."

But, again, this is a system that is in the process of change. We have to encourage them.

As far as Jackson-Vanik goes, my own feeling is that if there are improvements of this sort and if the Soviets do begin to increase the numbers who are allowed out instead of restricting it, I am prepared to be more flexible.

Representative Richardson. Ambassador Hartman, would you like to comment on that?

Ambassador HARTMAN. I would agree with the last statement made. It seems to me that was the purpose of the Jackson-Vanik amendment. I was the Assistant Secretary when that was passed, and I opposed it because it seemed to me that it tied us too much to specific numbers. It did not give the administration flexibility to really talk to the Soviet Union and to have some carrots around to offer.

I think, myself, the Soviets are not putting great store on this now, and I do not know how much they see the advantages in terms of a strict MFN application. Basically the Soviets want to be treated as equals, and for that reason they are concerned about it, not so much in terms of the tariff treatment that they get but of psychology.

I think that we should give them credit for what they have done, but I think we must continue to keep the pressure on in terms of efforts in the future and bringing individual cases to their attention.

Representative RICHARDSON. Mr. Reddaway.

Mr. REDDAWAY. On Jackson-Vanik, I would recommend leaving well alone. It seems to me you have got a reasonable mechanism there. There is nothing absolutely spelled out in writing about figures, as I understand it. It was a sort of informal agreement between Mr. Kissinger and the Soviets that emigration of something like the level of 60,000 Soviet Jews a year would be regarded as sufficient for MFN to be granted. That seems to me a reasonable state of affairs.

To start messing around with that would send, I think, confusing and possibly damaging signals. The Soviets did allow 60,000 people out of the Soviet Union in 1979. They were just reaching the point where they would qualify for MFN. So it is not as though it were something completely out of the range of possibility of what they can do, and of course, if they reach it and stay there for a year or two, then, of course, they should be given the carrot that has been promised to them.

One other area apart from exchanges, which has been mentioned, where I think the United States could do more than it does at the moment is, if jamming of radio stations is more or less removed or greatly reduced, then the quality of the radio broadcasts becomes more and more important. The quality is not bad at the moment, but it is something to which a higher priority could be attached—improving and extending the range and quality of the broadcasts through the Voice of America and through Radio Liberty, in particular. That would be a real contribution to glasnost policy.

Mr. STONE. I have nothing to add on Jackson-Vanik, but I would like to make one contribution on the first part of your question.

Many years ago when Ambassador Kennan wrote his famous "X" article in "Foreign Affairs Quarterly," he ended with some very wise and salutary advice. He said the best way for us to mold the Soviet Union into a good direction was to preserve at home our free institutions, and that was said during a period of anti-Communist hysteria.

I have lived through several periods of that kind in which the high reputation of our institutions were sullied and our Constitution ignored. I think the American example is very precious to the whole world, and I would like to see us keep it bright and shiny.

Representative **Richardson**. Ambassador Hartman, one last question. I understand you are out of the Foreign Service now?

Ambassador **Hartman**. That is correct.

Representative **Richardson**. So it is safe to ask this. I would like to know: what would you be telling the President if you were to advise him, the objective obviously being to conclude an arms control agreement, an INF agreement? What would be the parameters, do you think, that would lead towards a successful negotiation?

And let me just say something before you respond, and that is that I hope that this Nation has the good sense of someday using your services again. I do not know the circumstances with which you left the Embassy. I felt just through the perception that it was kind of done in a graceless way, and I would hope that this Nation has the good sense maybe, if you so feel that way, to come back and do the enormous good you have had throughout your career.

Ambassador **Hartman**. Well, thank you very much.

Let me say on an arms control agreement I do not think my advice would differ much now from what it did before I left the Foreign Service. We have got to have something that is balanced. We have got to have something that achieves a stability in the security situation.

I think the fact that now the Soviets have agreed to begin negotiations again on the intermediate-range missiles, concentrating on that, is an indication that both sides feel that a first agreement can be reached in that area; that the other areas are perhaps too difficult to achieve something in the short term. I think this indicates that both sides want to reach an agreement early this year and use that as a basis for going ahead with the program of visits back and forth.

I think Gorbachev does want to come to the United States. He does want an agreement that justifies his coming, and I think the intermediate-range missile area is one good one to concentrate on, as we continue also to negotiate major reductions in strategic arms. To get that we will have to talk about some restraints on testing and deployment in the space field.

Representative **Richardson**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman **Hoyer**. Thank you, Mr. Richardson.

And last on our list, a Member who has been a member of the Commission for some years from Massachusetts, Congressman Ed Markey. I would say in explanation of his lateness, they are marking up the trade bill now in his committee, a bill of some degree of interest to us all.

Congressman Markey.

STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE EDWARD J. MARKEY FROM MASSACHUSETTS

Representative **Markey**. Thank you. We are trying to encourage glasnost on the part of our trading partners with our trade bill, although some might disagree what the consequence will be.

I want to thank you all very, very much for coming, and I also want to publicly compliment Ambassador Hartman for the work that he has done over the years. He showed great hospitality when I was in Moscow, if you can imagine Bob Mrazek and Ed Markey in the Ambassador's kitchen at 2 a.m. in the morning cooking bacon and eggs in his absence. It was a very warm welcome that he gave us when we were there.

My question is just on glasnost itself and what role the United States should play in encouraging or discouraging it. Are we better off as a country—in our security—if this policy continues? Is that good for the United States? Should we be encouraging it vigorously? Should we be giving additional spurs to it? And how do you foresee 4 or 5 years down the line the Soviet Union in terms of its posture with our allies in Europe if this policy continues or with other parts of the world?

Is it good for us? Should we be encouraging it? What is going to be the result in your own estimation if he is successful in implementing such a policy?

Ambassador HARTMAN. Let me begin on that, if I may, and then I am afraid, Mr. Chairman, I am going to have to leave. The Speaker has invited me for lunch today to talk about his trip.

I do not think we should do anything specifically to try and finetune Soviet policy. I think we know so little about what is going on in that country that I would not want to make a U.S. policy on the basis that we were specifically having an influence on Soviet leadership to make certain decisions in a policy that is primarily directed at their internal situation.

The greatest thing we can do for it is to say to them,

> Look. This is the way the world wants you to behave. We would like to have more open negotiations, when it comes to something specifically that relates to glasnost like verification. Your moves in the direction of accepting verification are welcome, and now we would like to build those into treaty form.

This is a closed society, and we cannot forget that. When I walked out of the door of our dacha just outside of Moscow, I could go 50 yards down that road, but I could not turn left. I could not go up a road to the left. There was nothing up there. There were a few houses up there, but there was a militiaman always there to tell me I could not turn left. Well, you know, that society has a longway to go before true openness is a fact in their lives.

It is to our advantage that they move in that direction.

I would say we should encourage them. We should continue to press them, but we should not specifically try to tailor a policy to produce a result in a society that we know so little about its inner workings and debates.

Chairman HOYER. Mr. Ambassador, before the other members of the panel have an opportunity to respond to that or amplify their previous answers to that, I want to thank you very much on behalf of the Commission for testifying. I also want to reiterate the statements that have been made with respect to your past service and the hope that Mr. Richardson expressed and, I think, in which all of us share that your expertise and judgment will be available to us on a continuing basis notwithstanding your formal retirement from the Foreign Service.

Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

Ambassador **Hartman**. Thank you very much. I have to be going.

Chairman **Hoyer**. Professor Goldman, would you like to expand upon what you have already said with respect to that question?

Professor **Goldman**. I think that it is a very difficult question because, indeed, one of the things that is asked frequently, and I ask myself, if the Soviet Union really does go through the reform process, and it does indeed become a more effective producer, brings about economic reform, won't that be more threatening for us? I have always answered before, yes, that might still be good for us. In a sense it would be a race between the military side of the Soviet Union and the consumer side of the Soviet Union.

But now I think the answer becomes even more complicated because as part of this process of glasnost, as part of the process that Gorbachev has been calling the democratization of the country, there is the possibility, not the assurance, but there is the possibility that some of these things will be done in a more enlightened way with some form of checks and balances, with some kinds of control, with a much greater emphasis than before on popular pressure. This would mean presumably more consumer goods, and then in the same kind of battle that we have in this country, some overt fights between how they divide up the budget. Will more go for consumption? Will they build highways instead of military airport runways?

So my answer today is to the extent that Gorbachev succeeds, and I have my doubts whether or not he will succeed, but to the extent he succeeds, to the extent he builds up these elections, even though they are not the kind of elections we know, it will give rise to some form of restraint on the use of enhanced Soviet military power.

In my formal presentation I quoted Gorbachev saying that "a worker will not work on a house unless the worker has some sense the house is for him." It may well be in our interests to see that this house construction goes ahead. If it does, I will not be quite as frightened with the form of technology development that Gorbachev seeks to want.

Again, you will also have to remember that if you look at the Soviet system as it is now—one of the reasons why Gorbachev is so worried is that he fears the Soviet Union will become a third class power unless they change. When you were there, I am sure you were struck by the contrasts. Here is this great big military power. At the same time it is very weak when it comes to all other kinds of services and activities. In terms of its export profile, in terms of its production profile, it has a long way to go.

Representative **Markey**. When I was last in Moscow, it took, just parenthetically, about one-half hour to get permission for them to make one Xerox copy in a hotel, and I realized then that the society was not going to be able to win against 5 million kids who just received minicomputers at Christmas in this country, who are breaking down DNA in their homes as of December 26 in this country. So I am just wondering what kind of threat does it pose to us if we in our own ways help to encourage it, and again, should we encourage it? And if we do encourage it, what is the consequence in terms of our own relationship with them vis-a-vis the rest of the world?

Mr. **Reddaway**. Well, if I could answer, I would basically agree with what Marshall Goldman has said. I think it is fundamentally in the U.S. interest for glasnost to prosper in the Soviet Union, and I think it is probably in the U.S. interest for Gorbachev personally to prosper as long as possible.

It is a highly complicated question, highly speculative, as Marshall has quite rightly stressed. So one makes such broad judgments with some diffidence.

As regards how much the United States should openly support glasnost or Mr. Gorbachev personally, that I think is another tricky question, and my thoughts on that would be to say it is best not to do it too enthusiastically and too openly. It might not be good for Mr. Gorbachev within the Soviet Union to be seen to be on too close and friendly terms with the United States. It might actually undermine his position at home.

But at the same time, of course, he should be rewarded in various concrete ways. If he makes concessions, he should be rewarded with some sort of concessions from the American side, and this is a broader point which I think I can make with less diffidence. I think Mr. Gorbachev, although he is a very tough negotiator, tough bargainer, he is anxious to be in negotiation with the United States on a very wide range of issues, and I know that many different parts of the American executive are in negotiations with him on a wide range of issues. I spent over an hour the other day helping to brief one of the assistant secretaries in HUD and was delighted to find the extent of the relations between HUD and their equivalent, the State Construction Corporation in the Soviet Union existing and the ongoing nature of those relations.

Maybe there are other areas where Mr. Gorbachev is keen to get into negotiation, and as yet, the American side has been a little slow in responding. I would advocate as much as possible engagement with Mr. Gorbachev, trying to find out which areas mutually advantageous arrangements can be made in, because I think he will be anxious to negotiate. He will negotiate toughly, but he will make concessions in order to get deals.

So I think it is an unusually promising moment in the history of U.S./Soviet relations for doing business and for doing it to mutual advantage.

Representative **Markey**. Thank you.

Mr. Stone.

Mr. **Stone**. I would say that whatever leads to a more open and humane society is in our interest and in accord with our traditions.

May I raise a question? It is perhaps too late to raise it, but I think it is a shame we did not have a chance to discuss the most fundamental question of all. Is it possible for the Soviet Union to evolve away from the one-party state and Leninism?

Chairman **Hoyer**. I think that is a good question and we will perhaps deal with it. I think we have dealt with it perhaps in the observation as to whether Gorbachev can, in fact, be successful with glasnost and how far he can go. In fact, as Senator D'Amato observed perhaps Gorbachev cannot succeed, that the institution cannot change, that in fact the intransigence of the bureaucracy and the elites will not allow that.

Mr. STONE. I do have a suggestion if I may. In the course of trying to help the liberation of Russia from within and to get away from the frozen theology of Marxism/Leninism, it is possible to play off the heritage of Marx against the heritage of Lenin. Nowhere can you find in Marx and Engels the idea that the Socialist utopia would be a place where there would be no freedom of expression and no freedom of the arts.

Marx began as a journalist by fighting the censorship in Prussia, very much like that in the Soviet Union. He enjoyed freedom of speech as a correspondent for the New York Tribune not only on European, but on American questions, and when the revolution came, the greatest living Marxist theoretician, Karl Kausky, put a question to Lenin that still needs to be put to Russia and China. Kausky questioned very simply, "How will you know what the workers are thinking if you don't have a free press?"

Chairman HOYER. Mr. Markey.

Representative MARKEY. Do you believe that is a question that we ought to deal with in another hearing, Professor Goldman?

Professor GOLDMAN. Well, sure. I always believe in hearings. I am not sure we are going to solve that problem.

Let me come back to the question that you raised earlier and that Peter Reddaway responded to which relates a little bit to what Mr. Stone said. Imagine you are a dissident inside the Soviet Union. One of my friends just came back from meeting with a group of them, including one whose husband just died in a prison camp. They are very supportive of what Gorbachev is doing.

Do they issue a statement on his behalf? This goes back to the question of do we issue a statement or does this Commission issue a statement on Gorbachev's behalf? That would be the kiss of death for him.

At the same time they want him to succeed, and the dilemma is: how do you encourage pluralism, whether it be a two-party system, and even pluralism and checks and balances in a system? That is a fascinating exercise, and we see it now going on in most of the countries of Eastern Europe and in China. It is one that the Soviets are going to have to wrestle with because Gorbachev himself has come along to recognize such a need. There are other scholars saying the same thing inside of the Soviet Union, "Half-truths are worse than lies in some instances because you are leading yourself down the wrong path."

Thank you.

Chairman HOYER. Mr. Reddaway, we will let you have the last word.

Mr. REDDAWAY. If I could make a very quick response, I myself cannot foresee the Soviet system abandoning either Leninist doctrine or the one-party system. I think that is trying to square the circle, but I think hearings to identify exactly those places within the system which, as it were, are immutably resistant to change might assist our understanding of the whole system. So I would be in favor of such hearings.

Representative MARKEY. Is that your feeling generally, Professor?

Professor GOLDMAN. Yes, very much.

Representative MARKEY. You share Mr. Reddaway's doubt that there is going to be a change?

Professor GOLDMAN. Very much, and I said earlier that I am not even sure that Gorbachev is going to be there long enough to see it. I think his term is going to be shorter than the normal Senator's term.

Representative MARKEY. Thank you.

Chairman HOYER. Well, I guess the question is what is the normal Congressman's term, but we will not get into that.

Representative MARKEY. That is an oxymoron as far as the public is concerned.

Chairman HOYER. That is not the subject of this hearing and presumably will not be the subject of future hearings. That pushes glasnost just a little too far.

I want to thank each of you, Mr. Goldman, Mr. Reddaway and Mr. Stone, all distinguished and knowledgeable individuals with respect to the subject that is obviously critical to our society and critical to the world. The questions that have been asked, I think, have no definite answers. We are going to have to wait to see what happens.

I think each of you have made a great contribution. To those members of the Commission who were not here, I am going to urge that we make available excerpts of the hearing so that they can review it because I think each of you have added some very, very worthwhile food for thought. I am sure we will keep that in mind. I will be traveling to the Soviet Union with Speaker Wright next month. I am very pleased that I had this opportunity to be educated, as I have been and as the other members of the Commission have been, during the course of this hearing.

So we thank all of you and look forward to working closely with you as we pursue these developments.

Thank you very much.

[Whereupon, at 12:20 p.m., the Commission was adjourned, subject to the call of the chair.]

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March 25, 1987

The Honorable Steny Hoyer
Chairman, Helsinki Commission
House Annex 2
Room 237
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Steny,

First of all, we want to tell you how much we enjoyed your hearing yesterday on "glasnost." The questions were provocative and each of the witnesses contributed a useful perspective. We also were impressed by the detailed write-up in the Post this morning.

In order to further complete the record of the hearing, we would like to request that you submit the enclosed NCSJ Year End Report (please feel free to take excerpts) and summary, both of which provide an analysis of "glasnost," as well as the emigration statistics.

Thanks for your continued support.

Sincerely yours,

Mark B. Levin
Washington Representative

Barbara
Barbara Gaffin
Congressional Liaison

enc.

A coalition of forty-five national organizations and over three hundred local community councils and federations

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WRAP-UP
LEADERSHIP
REPORT

National
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THE ILLUSION OF "GLASNOST":
A Survey on the Status of Soviet Jewry in 1986

For nearly two million Jews in the Soviet Union, 1986 was a year of dramatic, but largely disappointing, developments. While a policy of "glasnost" (openness) dominated the Western perception of the Soviet Union, the character and direction of Mikhail Gorbachev's Jewish policy belie this perception. Unquestionably, there has been a discernable shift since Gorbachev assumed leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. For Jews in the Soviet Union, however, the results of the shift, such as a new emigration decree, proved to be merely tactical and cosmetic. In fact, there is a continuing shutdown of Jewish emigration, as well as a persistent harassment and intimidation of Jewish self-study efforts to sustain culture and religion.

In the aftermath of the US-USSR Geneva summit in November 1985, the first such meeting between President Ronald Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev, an official of a major American Jewish organization was assured by a Soviet diplomat in Washington that early renewal of Jewish emigration could be expected. This assurance was published on the front pages of leading American newspapers. In the months which followed, it became apparent that performance would not follow promise, as emigration dropped to its lowest point in over a decade. Yet, for several weeks, the Soviet effort to manipulate opinion did create confusion among some sectors of the Jewish community, and among press analysts, members of Congress and Administration officials.

EMIGRATION STAGNATES

The emigration of Jews remained stagnant and, despite occasional promises of hope, only 914 Jews were permitted to leave in 1986, compared with 1,140 in 1985 and 896 the previous year.

The year began on a low note when, in January, only 79 Jews left the Soviet Union. Encouragement was generated in early February when Natan (Anatoly) Scharansky was suddenly released from Chistopol prison. In a dramatic walk over the Glienecke Bridge, from East to West Berlin, he was released at nearly the same moment as convicted Soviet-bloc spies, who were sent eastward. Even at the last moment, the Soviet Union tried to maintain its stubborn insistence on a "spy" charge against Scharansky, one of the most publicized of the Jewish Prisoners of Conscience (POC), who had been serving a combined term of 13 years in prison and labor camp.

While there was great rejoicing at Scharansky's release, there was immediate and justified apprehension concerning the situation of thousands of other Soviet Jews. Among them were the other Jewish POC's, as well as over two dozen former POC's who had served their sentences but were still denied permission to go to Israel.

Nearly 380,000 Jews in the Soviet Union are estimated to have taken the first step in the emigration process by requesting and having sent to them an affidavit (vyzov) from Israel, a crucially important document

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when formally applying for an exit visa. Within this group, the NCSJ identified over 11,000 who held the status of "refusenik," one who has been refused an exit visa at least once and, not infrequently, numerous times. These refuseniks, whose cases are well known and were repeatedly raised with Soviet officials, continued to be refused permission to be reunited with family and repatriated to Israel. Many have been waiting for more than fifteen years. There are also thousands of others whose applications were not processed and are, therefore, not yet in the pipeline.

In April, a top Moscow specialist on nationality questions, lecturing before a principal Soviet propaganda body - the Znaniye Society, acknowledged that 10 to 15 percent of Soviet Jews currently would seek to emigrate. Since the latest official Soviet census numbers the Jewish population at about 1.8 million, he implicitly acknowledged that between 180,000 and 270,000 Jews could be expected to emigrate. This admission is far closer to Western data than to official pronouncements, which continued to surface throughout the year, of "a few thousand" waiting to be processed.

The emigration figures offered proof that an announced and continuing "humanitarianism campaign" was hollow. In February, the month of Scharansky's release, 84 Jews emigrated, but the following month this number plummeted to 47. The highest monthly figure was 125, in September, when the Soviet Union was preparing for an anticipated second summit. In October, even while a US-Soviet summit meeting was organized in Reykjavik, the figure dropped to 104, then to 102 in November, and in December, only 77.

The good news was that several prominent former POC's and long-term refuseniks were allowed to emigrate, including Benjamin Bogomolny, Eliahu Essas, David Goldfarb, Isai and Grigori Goldshtein, Yakov Gorodetsky, Iosif Irlin, Isaac Kogan, and Yaakov Mesh. In addition, after a major public campaign, Mikhail Shirman's sister, Inessa Fleurova, was belatedly allowed to go to Israel to provide her critically ill brother with a desperately needed bone marrow transplant. In the case of Goldfarb, as well as Shirman, Soviet concern for these individuals was delivered with a cynical twist.

Shirman's request for permission to go to Israel had been made in the spring. The need for the transplant was urgent then, but it was only in the weeks which followed the Reykjavik meeting that Ms. Fleurova was granted permission. According to Israeli medical specialists, her release may have come too late to save her brother's life.

In the case of the 68-year-old David Goldfarb, a Soviet "information effort" was also evident. His son, Alex, with NCSJ assistance, had lobbied for years for his family's right to emigrate. Less than one week after the conclusion of the Reykjavik meeting, David Goldfarb and his wife were finally allowed to leave, aboard the private plane of Occidental Petroleum Chairman, Dr. Armand Hammer. Shortly after Goldfarb's arrival in the United States, he was found to be suffering from lung cancer, offering tragic proof that he had not received adequate medical attention in the Soviet Union.

There were also repeated refusals, often of long-suffering individuals, as in the case of Professor Naum Meiman and his wife, Inna, who is critically ill with cancer. The 74-year-old scientist was a member of the Helsinki Monitoring Group and has been repeatedly denied his wish to be reunited with his daughter. In addition, Inna Meiman has sought specialized medical treatment for her condition. In mid-December, following a visit to Moscow by Senator Gary D. Hart, Inna Meiman was told that she alone would be given a travel permit, but only to seek necessary medical treatment, after which she must return.

There seemed to be no end to acts of individual harassment and arrests. In some cases, there were convictions on trumped-up charges and imprisonment under harsh conditions. In January, Soviet militiamen and plainclothes police raided an apartment in Razliv, near Leningrad, on a Friday evening, compelling Jews celebrating the Sabbath to stand for hours outside in the cold, under the pretext of holding a religious ceremony in "unauthorized premises." A few weeks later, in the same city, two women were arrested and released after having telephoned friends in Israel.

In March, the telephone of Professor Meiman was disconnected. The authorities made no allowance for either his age or his wife's terminal illness. Virtually at the same time, Aleksei Magarik, a 27-year-old cellist and Hebrew teacher, and a refusenik since 1984, was arrested on false drug possession charges as he was about to board a plane for Tbilisi. He was subsequently tried, convicted and sentenced to three years in prison, where he has been housed with dangerous criminals and beaten repeatedly. Appeals on his behalf remained unheard, and he joined the other Jewish Prisoners of Conscience, nearly half of whom have been sentenced since Gorbachev came to power. In the last eight months, alarming news continued to reach the West of the physical abuse of several Jewish prisoners, especially Magarik, Yuli Edelshtein, Iosif Begun and Vladimir Lifshitz.

RELIGIOUS VISE TIGHTENED

Holiday periods were especially difficult for Soviet Jews. During Passover, there was a shortage of matzoh (unleavened bread) in most areas with a large Jewish population. Only 130 tons were baked in Moscow, as opposed to 170 tons in 1978 and 150 tons in both 1979 and 1980.

The Purim holiday was marred in Kishinev by KGB raids on private homes where parties were being held. In Moscow and Leningrad, authorities merely issued warnings cautioning prospective hosts against attempting to celebrate.

Private Judaic religious study became a prime target of official pressure. A 28-year-old educator, Pinchas Polonsky, who is a member of a small synagogue in Moscow's Marina Roshcha area, was warned on May 30 by a city prosecutor that he might be criminally charged for violating a statute dealing with the separation of church and state, since "education is the province of the state." Despite the fact that for Jews a synagogue is a place of worship and study, among the reported allegations were studying Talmud after the morning service and organizing an unregistered religious group.

One month later, Ze'ev Dashevsky of Moscow was warned by a government official that his efforts in organizing private seminars for the study of religion could be considered as violating Soviet law. He was also warned that he was meeting with foreigners "too often," a sign that authorities might attempt to further isolate refuseniks.

Holding Sabbath services and holiday parties, attending religious study groups or synagogue services, organizing private study groups and meeting with foreigners, plus making telephone calls to other countries, are basic rights as defined in the Helsinki Accords in 1975 and reemphasized in the final document of the 1983 Madrid follow-up conference. Nevertheless, Soviet authorities seemed to imply that only narrowly defined religious prayer services in synagogue would be acceptable.

There was a report on September 9 of the destruction of a Moscow mikvah (ritual bath). During a visit to the United States in October, under the auspices of the New York-based Appeal to Conscience Foundation, Konstantin Karchev, Chairman of the Council of Religious Affairs in the USSR, told a press conference that since the mikvah had been constructed in "violation of the building code," it was temporarily closed and would be opened as soon as possible. In any event, he insisted that it had not been destroyed. Independent verification by the NCSJ in December indicated that the mikvah was, in fact, sealed. Karchev also denounced Westerners who, he alleged, had spread lies provided by Soviet citizens concerning the destruction of the mikvah, and other Soviet Jewry issues.

SOVIET TACTICAL SHIFTS

In public and private discussions with corporate executives and government officials from the West, it was clear that Gorbachev is aware of the extent of the desire for family reunification and emigration to Israel on the part of a significant segment of Soviet Jews. He is also cognizant of Western demands for Soviet compliance with the "humanitarian" provisions of Basket 3 of the Helsinki Accords, which focuses heavily upon the reunion of families. The Kremlin leader sought to meet Western criticism with vigorous, but nonspecific, public assertions about Soviet commitments to the "humanitarian" aspirations of the Helsinki agreement.

Gorbachev had agreed to participate in a joint statement with President Ronald Reagan at the Geneva Summit in November 1985, which, inter alia, pledged the resolution of "humanitarian cases in the spirit of cooperation." He had made a similar statement on French television two months earlier, when he noted that in regard to "reunion" with families in Israel, "we will continue to resolve these questions . . . on the basis of a humanitarian approach." The only "exceptions" to this approach, he stated, would arise "when individuals . . . know state secrets." (At a UN meeting in Geneva in 1984, the Soviet delegate, Dimitri Bykov, revealed that in the previous two years more than 50 percent of Jewish applicants for exit visas were turned down!) But Gorbachev assured his French audience that, after five or ten years, the "security" obstacle would no longer apply.

When the General Secretary addressed the 27th Soviet Communist Party Congress in February, he enumerated several "fundamental principles" which guide Soviet decision-making in the international arena, including the handling "in a humane and positive spirit" of questions related to the "reunification of families." In July, at a Moscow dinner honoring French President Francois Mitterrand, Gorbachev promised that the USSR was prepared for "international cooperation on humanitarian problems, and these were not mere words."

It seemed that, for Jews, these remained "mere words," as illustrated by the reality of Soviet policy. For example, as measured by arrivals in Vienna, the number of Jews granted exit visas to Israel had dipped drastically to one of the lowest monthly averages since 1964, when a limited exodus was allowed. (Only in 1968, the year after the Six-Day War in the Middle East, was the rate lower.) The rate is far below that of 1971, when over 13,000 Jews left, marking the year when meaningful Jewish emigration began. It grew to significant numbers throughout the seventies, and reached a high point in 1979, when over 51,000 permits were granted.

What makes this recent development significant is that an experts' meeting under the "Helsinki Process" dealing with "human contacts" and reunion of families took place in Bern, Switzerland, in April and May. Moscow had no hesitancy in abridging the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act dealing with "human contacts," just prior to and during the meeting. It also attempted, in effect, to "close the book" on Jewish emigration.

At Bern the Kremlin attempted to promote several new policy lines. In private meetings with Western delegations, Soviet delegates insisted they could not permit the sending of Jews to the "war danger zone" of Israel, or to "occupied Palestine." Other Jews who had emigrated to the US or Canada were contemptuously referred to as "illegals."

Especially significant was a Soviet maneuver to remove Jewish emigration to Israel entirely from the agenda. The Soviet delegation sought to limit the granting of visas for family visits and reunion of families to "participating states," i.e., the 35 North American and European signatories to the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, acknowledging they wanted to prevent "reunion of families" in Israel.

The new posture had ominous, broader overtones. The Soviet Union seemed to be pressing to consider Basket 3 a "finished subject." At previous meetings, Soviet representatives linked progress in Jewish emigration to improved bilateral and multilateral relations. Such references were absent in Bern.

After the Soviet initiative was rebuffed, the Soviet delegate exploded at a closed session when US Ambassador Michael Novak distributed a list of Soviet citizens, mostly Jewish refuseniks, seeking reunification with relatives in Israel. In a rare burst of public anger, the Soviet delegate used the tactical reversal evident in media appearances and public encounters, calling the list "libelous" and charging that it smacked of "McCarthyism."

Other Soviet maneuvering in discussions on human rights included charging the West with a variety of rights violations, and the recitation of social ills, including racial discrimination. This newest round seemed designed to obscure mounting accusations that Moscow was avoiding fulfillment of its own human rights obligations under the Helsinki Accords.

In July, the Soviet Union engaged in another attempt to defuse criticism by opening a Department of Humanitarian and Cultural Affairs in the Foreign Ministry. This was soon followed by the establishment of a Human Rights Commission, to be composed of intellectuals, workers and journalists, ostensibly to correct Western "distorted opinion" concerning human rights in the Soviet Union, and to be used in future Helsinki Accords follow-up meetings and summits. In part, this may have been an effort to create a counterforce to the highly vocal and effective US Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

REYKJAVIK SUMMIT MEETING

Midyear saw the gearing-up of the organized American Jewish community for an anticipated second summit between the US and the USSR, which was tentatively scheduled for late 1986. The NCSJ set in motion the community-wide "Campaign to Summit II," with Congressional leadership joining in the Washington launching of a Petition Campaign, while Secretary of State George P. Shultz received a position paper from the NCSJ, entitled Rescuing Soviet Jewry. To facilitate activities, Summit Watch, a periodic newsletter, was launched.

Even as preparations went ahead for the anticipated summit, the case of Nicholas Daniloff, the Moscow correspondent of U.S. News and World Report, exploded. Daniloff was charged with "possession of state secrets," and was arrested in Moscow. Speculation became rife as to whether there would in fact be a summit. To the surprise of many, on September 30 President Reagan announced that he and General Secretary Gorbachev would meet in what was initially viewed as a pre-summit meeting, in Iceland on October 11-12. Seemingly, to help smooth the path to Reykjavik, Daniloff was released and Secretary of State Shultz announced that Moscow had also freed the noted dissident Yuri Orlov. Symptomatically, none of the Jewish refuseniks or Prisoners of Conscience previously mentioned for possible "summit release" were included in the arrangement, promoting great apprehension in the Jewish community about Soviet intentions.

Following NCSJ negotiations with the Iceland government, a Jewish leadership delegation traveled to Reykjavik on October 10 to hold a press conference and to depart the same day. It was held at the official venue of the Iceland Media Center and attended by more than 100 members of the international media. Participants also included former refuseniks and relatives of Jews still in the Soviet Union, whose presence in Iceland was facilitated by the NCSJ.

The Soviet Union countered the event by holding a "human rights" press briefing at the same hour, at their nearby headquarters in the Saga Hotel. The briefing was but one element in a well-orchestrated public information campaign. There were other briefings at which they even accepted, but declined to answer, questions from former refuseniks concerning both general human rights issues and personal requests, preferring instead to schedule private meetings.

Thus, Foreign Ministry Spokesman Gennadi Gerasimov and Samuil Zivs, Deputy Chairman of the "Anti-Zionist Committee of the Soviet Public," listened "patiently" while former refuseniks told of the plight of their relatives and friends seeking to emigrate. Other Soviet officials strolled through the lobby of the hotel, which housed many American journalists, offering friendly greetings and pausing to answer questions.

When Alex Goldfarb and Aleksandr Slepak, son of Vladimir and Maria Slepak, encountered Soviet Ambassador to the United States Yuri Dubinin on a flight returning to the US from Reykjavik, they were invited to talk about their cases at the Soviet embassy in Washington. Ambassador Dubinin's invitation proved to be another gesture lacking substance, as the young men were shunted to minor functionaries. Vladimir Slepak still awaits permission to emigrate, and David Goldfarb's release seemed more the result of intervention by Dr. Armand Hammer, a frequent visitor to the USSR. Goldfarb flew to the United States on Dr. Hammer's personal plane, when the industrialist returned from a series of meetings with Soviet officials.

Although the exploitation of the anxieties of former refuseniks, and their own "media accessability" were, on the surface, effective tools in the Soviet public information campaign, the Jewish presence in Reykjavik accomplished its own goals. The overall assessment was that Soviet Jewish rights had become a major issue at Reykjavik and could not be avoided as a summit agenda item in the future. "The status of Soviet Jews has emerged in advance as a central topic at the Reagan-Gorbachev meeting here this weekend," began a page one story in the October 11 New York Times. This was clearly a major shift away from previous positions at summit meetings when human rights, if discussed at all, were dealt with in a relatively unpublicized way. Also mentioned was the fact that "A special delegation from the National Conference on Soviet Jewry, headed by its chairman, Morris B. Abram, flew in from New York . . . carrying a two foot package of information on the 11,000 (Refuseniks in the Soviet Union)."

Two days later, Secretary of State Shultz spoke on the subject of human rights issues in Reykjavik and declared that "The issue of human rights was brought up on a number of occasions and some very significant material (furnished by the NCSJ) was passed to the Soviet Union, which they accepted, that stated not only our views, but, in detail, things about Jewish emigration, the numbers of people who have signified their desire to leave, lists of people, things of that kind." Afterward, at the National Press Club in Washington, the Secretary reiterated the NCSJ's help, "which enabled us to make a powerful presentation" (at the Iceland meeting).

HELSINKI PROCESS FOLLOW-UP MEETING

Reykjavik was followed by the convening in Vienna of the Third Review Meeting, under the so-called "Helsinki Process," of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The session, which opened on November 4, was scheduled to last until July 1987.

In the first six weeks it was apparent that the United States, Britain and other Western delegations were continuing their policy of engaging the Soviet Union on human rights issues. In debates, speeches, papers and confrontations with Soviet delegates, US delegation head Ambassador Warren Zimmerman and his colleagues pressed the Soviet Union concerning Prisoners of Conscience, long-term refuseniks and the campaign of harassment, arrest, imprisonment and abuse of Jews in the USSR.

The Soviet Union countered with citations of Western human rights "violations" and again assumed an aggressive, active role when it called for the convening of a "Conference on Development of Humanitarian Cooperation" in Moscow. The Soviet Union also released details of a new Codification of Emigration Decree, which it described as "liberalizing" procedures. In fact, the timing may have been designed to obscure complaints about the reality of Soviet emigration practices, when Moscow faced public criticism for human rights violations at the Review Conference. Rumors continued to circulate among the hopeful that Moscow would actually use the decree, when it became operational on January 1, 1987, to loosen up some of the backlog in Jewish emigration.

In a paper prepared for the meeting, NCSJ Chairman Morris B. Abram, who served as a public member of the US delegation, wrote that "Whereas the Soviet Union disputes the fact that it has violated any arms agreements, there is no question that it has flagrantly violated the human rights provisions of the Helsinki Accords. Why is the Soviet Union so scared of simple men and women, who just want to leave and go somewhere else? Why is the Soviet Union so frightened by the thought of a Hebrew teacher or a housewife wanting to leave, that it feels the need to crush them, and all those like them, unrelentingly, remorselessly? What sort of inner demon are they fighting? What sort of insecurity are they suppressing, that the Soviet Union can't just let them go?"

Commenting on the new Soviet approach, Ambassador Samuel G. Wise of the United States delegation described the Soviet attitude at the Vienna meeting: "As someone who has seen something of the CSCE process, I have witnessed a gradual change in Soviet official attitudes toward the human rights debate. From the sullen stonewall of the Belgrade Conference, characterized by the bogus claims of intervention in internal affairs, we have now reached the point where the East appears to be enthusiastically engaging in a human rights debate, and some Eastern countries, but not always the Soviet Union, are actually offering some minimal response to Western concerns. In the realm of real-life implementation, although the Soviet gestures have been largely superficial and incidental, the fairly steady stream of high-profile case resolutions has been clearly aimed at satisfying worldwide concerns over Soviet human rights violations."

NEW DECREE CODIFIES EMIGRATION

The Codification of Emigration Decree was issued by the Supreme Soviet on November 6, 1986. Purportedly progressive, it was soon viewed by Jewish activists in the Soviet Union, and by many outside analysts, as potentially thwarting Jewish efforts at family reunification and repatriation to Israel. There had been some hope of a positive shift in policy when some refuseniks noted that the decree, which updated a 1970 statute, had by implication recognized that departure was not a "criminal act," and that under certain conditions "ordinary citizens" could depart from the USSR.

A close reading of the text suggested that the formal rules actually offered little hope for hundreds of thousands, mostly Jews, seeking the right to leave. That included the refuseniks who have applied for and have been refused permission to go to Israel. The decree codified what had been restrictive practices operational since 1980, which allowed Jews to leave only on the basis of family reunification, rather than as a fundamental right. Seemingly humanitarian, it now fixed in law the narrow definition of family as including parents, children and siblings, condemning hundreds of thousands of people from ever applying for, much less receiving, permission to leave.

The new decree left Soviet authorities with absolute power to reject applications for emigration. It ignored many of the human rights provisions of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the more recent Helsinki Accords, to which the Soviet Union is signatory. This cast doubt on the full adherence by the Soviet Union, in the future, to other international covenants or accords.

The decree continued the practice of withholding permission from those who have "knowledge of state secrets." While a state may have legitimate security concerns, the decree does not define the term, nor does it contain a ceiling on time. This vagueness is consonant with the Soviet practice of arbitrarily denying the right to repatriate to Israel to thousands of families.

Forgotten was Mikhail Gorbachev's promise that such cases would be resolved within five years or, at a maximum, ten years. A careful analysis of available data reveals that hundreds of refuseniks have been rejected on security grounds for longer periods. Over 600 Soviet Jewish scientists alone were identified as waiting between five and ten years for exit visas; nearly 100 of them have waited for over ten years.

November also saw the death of ailing refusenik Haim Elbert, only two days after learning of his latest denial of permission to emigrate, based on false charges against his son. In December, Efraim Rozenshtein, the 17-year-old son of prominent Orthodox refuseniks Grigory and Natalia Rozenshtein, who first applied to emigrate and were refused in 1974, was threatened with military conscription, thus dimming the family's hope to emigrate. Efraim was only five years old at the time of the family's first application and refusal. After twelve years, the young man was being threatened with the charge of "draft evasion," a favorite ploy concerning refuseniks.

The Elbert and Rozenshtein cases underscored the absolute, and often cruel, power vested in Soviet authorities to prohibit emigration.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT SUPPORT

The United States government was well informed, at the highest level, concerning the Soviet record on Jewish emigration. After receiving a NCSJ Position Paper in September, Secretary of State Shultz concluded that the situation of Soviet Jewry is "bleak and deteriorating."

On December 3, State Department spokesman Charles Redman was quoted as saying that Soviet compliance with human rights provisions of the Helsinki Accords remained "seriously flawed." Two days later, President Reagan, responding to an earlier letter from NCSJ Chairman Morris B. Abram, expressing appreciation for United States efforts on behalf of Soviet Jewry at the Reykjavik meeting, wrote that, "The plight of Soviet Jewry is a matter of deep personal concern to me and to the other members of the United States government."

In his letter, the president noted that "Our thorough preparation for Reykjavik was also due in great part to information provided by private American Jewish organizations. In this connection," the president continued, "let me thank you for the materials on Soviet Jewish emigration that you gave Secretary Shultz. . . . We were able to make good use of them both in Reykjavik and Moscow."

The president concluded, "Please accept my assurances that the tragic circumstances of Soviet Jews will continue to be an issue of the highest priority in all our dealings with the Soviet Union. We will not forget how much they suffer because of their desire to live in freedom and practice their religion without persecution, and we will do everything in our power to help them."

THE PRIORITY FOR JEWISH ACTIVISTS

Despite the continuing commitment of concern from the United States and other Western governments, the year ended with little real change in sight. Nevertheless, hoping for significant progress in the near future, Jewish activists in the Soviet Union articulated what they considered to be basic principles which would affect their destiny.

In over a dozen petitions to reach the West, those Jews pursuing informal Jewish study wanted their activities to be formalized. Hebrew, alone among modern or ancient languages, could not be taught to or studied by ordinary citizens. It remained under a virtual ban and those attempting to teach continued to face harassment and imprisonment. The need to have an acceptable means for studying and passing on Jewish religious and cultural traditions was of significant concern to Jews, especially the young.

For many, however, the primary goal remained repatriation to Israel and reunification with kin. In pursuit of these objectives, refuseniks developed a set of minimum guidelines which the National Conference endorsed, namely: immediate exit visas to those in refusal for ten years or more; an exit visa within one year to those in refusal for five to ten years; an exit visa within two years to all those who have received a refusal; and, as a matter of priority, the release of the Prisoners of Conscience, according to an agreed-upon timetable, based on the length and percentage of time already served in prison or labor camp. The proposals also sought immediate exit visas for all former prisoners who have applied to go to Israel; the granting of exit visas within five years after the end of a security job for those refused on security grounds, or on grounds of military service; and a controlled rate of future exit visas for all applicants, as part of an institutionalized process which allowed more than 51,000 Jews to exit in 1979.

THE JACKSON-VANIK AMENDMENT

Questions concerning the Jackson-Vanik Amendment continued to be raised in the Congress, notably after Soviet intimations of increased emigration were hinted at in the press. The amendment, officially known as the Freedom of Emigration Amendment to the Trade Reform Act (1974), denies favorable trade status and commercial credit to the Soviet Union and other communist countries that restrict emigration. It provides that its restrictions may be waived, year by year, if the president finds that there is a significant change in these restrictive policies. It has been a controversial law, but it remains a clear and effective expression of US commitment as it pertains to the rights of Soviet Jews and others.

Supporters of the amendment insisted that, despite the well-publicized cases affording freedom to a small number of individuals, there has been no sign of any real change. Since the emigration of Soviet Jews has actually diminished, while the harassment of Jewish cultural activists and would-be emigrants has increased, no change in the law or its application was appropriate.

The NCSJ, and its constituent agencies, did suggest flexibility to the Administration, and told Soviet officials privately and publicly that "Goodwill can be achieved, but concrete results must be forthcoming." This was emphasized in one of several newspaper ads printed throughout the year, including September 19, when Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze visited the United States.

In May, a coalition of Jewish groups stated:

> "We reiterate our support for the principles and the policies represented by the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, and affirm our opposition to legislative efforts to repeal it. We urge that US policy remain constant, since the USSR has yet to show that it is willing to abide by the rules protecting those human rights to which it gave its pledge at Helsinki.

> "We look for significant changes, including major steps to resolve the refusenik and Prisoner of Conscience issues, ending the present harassment of emigration applicants and study group participants and, of course, a very substantial climb in yearly levels of emigration.
>
> "In the end we continue to hope that the Soviet Union will allow emigration to increase. This is not just a 'Jewish issue' or a 'Western issue.' It is a fundamental matter of human rights recognized in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Helsinki Final Act."

In the end, if the Soviet Union wanted to demonstrate that there is substance to the much-heralded promise of "openness" and a society with a new and human face, as well as to demonstrate that it lives up to international commitments, it need only free the Prisoners of Conscience, including those whom it has incarcerated for teaching Hebrew and insisting on the right to be repatriated to Israel; grant visas to the thousands of refuseniks; and start issuing visas to the hundreds of thousands of Soviet Jews who have initiated the emigration procedure by requesting and receiving invitations from Israel.

January 1987

Jewish Emigration from the USSR



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National Conference on Soviet Jewry

SUMMARY

THE ILLUSION OF "GLASNOST":
A Survey on the Status of Soviet Jewry in 1986

For nearly two million Jews in the Soviet Union, 1986 was a year of dramatic, but largely disappointing, developments. Despite a policy of "glasnost" (openness) which dominated Western perception of the Soviet Union, the character and direction of Mikhail Gorbachev's Jewish policy belie this perception.

- Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union totaled only 914 in 1986, a 20 percent drop from 1,140 in 1985.
- Despite Soviet gestures in a few high visibility cases, such as those of Natan Scharansky and David Goldfarb, (or non-Jewish dissidents, such as Yuri Orlov and Andrei Sakharov), nearly 380,000 Jews await being processed for emigration, among them 11,000 refuseniks, and Prisoners of Conscience (POC's) who have been harassed, attacked, arrested and imprisoned because they wish to emigrate, or teach Hebrew.
- The persistent harassment and intimidation of Jewish self-study efforts to sustain culture and religion continues.
- Despite a discernible shift in tactics since General Secretary Gorbachev assumed leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the results of the shift, such as a new emigration decree, proved to be merely tactical and cosmetic for Soviet Jews.
- A new Codification of Emigration Decree fixed in law the narrowly defined family as including only parents, children and siblings, condemning hundreds of thousands of Jews from ever applying for, much less receiving, permission to emigrate.
- While Gorbachev is aware of the desire of many Soviet Jews to emigrate, and of Western demands for Soviet compliance with the humanitarian provisions of the Helsinki Accords, the reality of Soviet policy on Jewish emigration proves his many public statements on the issue to be "mere words."
- The Soviet Union has attempted, most notably at the Bern Conference last spring, to "close the book" on Soviet Jewish emigration, insisting that they could not permit the sending of Jews to the "war danger zone" of Israel.
- The October 11-12 meeting between President Ronald Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev in Reykjavik saw the issue of Soviet Jewish rights become an important future summit agenda item.

- over -

A coalition of forty-five national organizations and over three hundred local community councils and federations

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- The United States government is well informed concerning the Soviet record on Jewish emigration. Both President Reagan and Secretary of State George P. Shultz pledged to do everything in their power to help the Soviet Jews achieve human rights, including emigration based on repatriation to Israel and family reunification.

- Jewish activists in the Soviet Union have articulated what they considered to be basic principles in securing their rights. Their primary goal remained repatriation to Israel and reunification with kin. They articulated guidelines, endorsed by the NCSJ, including the granting of immediate exit visas to those in refusal for ten years or more.

- The Jackson-Vanik Amendment linking trade to emigration remains a clear and effective expression of United States commitment as it pertains to the rights of Soviet Jews and others.

- The NCSJ has suggested flexibility to the Administration and told Soviet officials, both privately and publicly, that "goodwill can be achieved, but concrete results must be forthcoming."

- The NCSJ challenged the Soviet Union to issue emigration visas to the hundreds of thousands of Soviet Jews who have initiated the emigration procedure by requesting and receiving invitations from their relatives in Israel.

SOVIET JEWRY RESEARCH BUREAU

Jewish Emigration From the USSR

Statistics

Oct. 1968 - 1970	4,235	1977	16,736
1971	13,022	1978	28,864
1972	31,681	1979	51,320
1973	34,733	1980	21,471
1974	20,628	1981	9,447
1975	13,221	1982	2,688
1976	14,261	1983	1,314

	1984	1985	1986	1987
January	88	61	79	98
February	90	88	84	146
March	51	98	47	
April	74	166	72	
May	109	51	49	
June	72	36	55	
July	85	174	31	
August	83	29	88	
September	69	93	126	
October	29	124	104	
November	55	128	102	
December	91	92	77	
	896	1,140	914	

From October 1968 - January 1987, 266,669 persons left the Soviet Union with Israeli visas. Approximately 163,795 of them went to Israel.

NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON SOVIET JEWRY

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Introduction to Excerpts from the Freedom House

"Glasnost" Seminar

Since December 1986 General Secretary Gorbachev has announced or instituted a number of changes in the Soviet Union, many of which have been described by the term "glasnost," the Russian word for "openness."

In the field of economics a new law will allow, as of May 1, 1987, twenty-nine types of private enterprises, including the manufacture of clothing, shoes, etc. Gorbachev has also abolished several ministries, improved incentives for workers, and cracked down on alcohol consumption.

In the area of human rights, the leading Soviet dissident, Dr. Andrei Sakharov, and his wife Elena Bonner, were permitted to return to Moscow from internal exile, and approximately one hundred Soviet political prisoners have been released from prison.

In the political sphere Mr. Gorbachev has suggested to the central Committee some low-level use of secret balloting, and in the world of literature and the arts previously unpublished books and poetry are being published and politically controversial films are being shown.

Greater self-expression and public participation in the discussion of various social problems have been evident in the Soviet Union, and the Soviet media are giving coverage to such previously suppressed events as the riots in Alma-Ata and various accidents.

But what do all of these changes actually mean for the Soviet people and the rest of the world? Are these initiatives permanent or are they all subject to retraction? And what should be our response to the various changes?

In an effort to help answer some of these questions, Freedom House invited nine former Soviet citizens, including prominent dissidents, artists, historians and writers, to discuss these questions and their possible ramifications for the future.

Following are a few excerpts from that day-long discussion, held on March 7, 1987.

Excerpts from the Freedom House Symposium on "Glasnost," held on March 7, 1987

(Complete transcript of the symposium can be obtained from Freedom House. Biographies of the participants are herewith enclosed.)

What has motivated Mr. Gorbachev to embark on these various reforms in Soviet society? Is it the realization that the USSR's extreme lag in technological development can be better overcome with greater intellectual freedom? Does he believe that he can get more support from the West in the form of credits, loans, technological know-how, etc., if he will project the image of democratization taking place in his country? To what degree have the Soviet Union's difficulties in the economic arena prompted these reforms?

Does the glasnost campaign represent a personal crusade for Mr. Gorbachev or is it simply a mechanism for him to consolidate his power within the Party structure?

VLADIMIR BUKOVSKY: What we are observing is not the result only of difficulties with technology and the economy. We all understand that reason very well. What we have is exhaustion of the Soviet Union in many fields.

Glasnost itself, although it's interpreted in a new way right now, I would rather call a campaign of official criticism. It's not just the necessity to attract more attention---or a ruse to attract Western attention and to deceive Westerners into believing that great changes are coming, which is also true---but it is not only that. It's a fact that the propaganda machine for the last 20, 25, 30 years became so discredited by the Soviets' lies that some elements of truth had to be introduced into it, otherwise it becomes some kind of completely wasteful exercise. The actual facts, sooner or later, penetrate into the Soviet Union through Western broadcasts or books or samizdat and thoroughly discredit the Soviet propaganda. So it serves their interests much better to tell a half truth instead of a complete lie. Make the usual propaganda thing more palatable. And it's the same in many other fields. It's exhaustion.

It's exhaustion in terms of the economy, in terms of natural resources, in terms of political potential, in terms of trust. They are just at the end of the rope in the way they are used to operating, and now they have to find some new ways and new approaches to refresh the system.

VASSILY AKSYONOV: I would say there is also the matter of certain ambitions. I knew personally some of those people who are now active participants in the glasnost process. I remember 1968, the time of the invasion of Czechoslovakia, and those people were awfully irked by the action taken by Brezhnev's leadership. They felt insulted, actually insulted. Some of them even worried that "Voroshilov's marksmen" were going to skip their generation. They are Dubceks, actually. They are fascinated with the idea of socialism with a human face. The great difference is that now it has sprung up in the center of the empire.

I do agree with Bukovsky, what he says about the exhaustion of the system. It's true. And they are preoccupied with the idea of saving the system, socialism, the essence of society. They see quite clearly that they are speeding toward the abyss, toward catastrophe. (I don't agree with Shcharansky, by the way, when he says that glasnost originated mostly with the idea of creating a public relations campaign in the West.)

I cannot rule it out, that some of them are sick of lying. Some of them are willing at least to try, although I am sure that they are not certain that they will succeed.

For instance, the guy who is now editing the *Moscow News*, which is coming out in both versions, English and Russian, and it's considered the most popular newspaper in Moscow now. He is Igor Yegor. I know him very well. And I know his frame of mind. He is really a rather broadminded person---and there are many other people like him. They really want to do something. Because this system, which was supposed to be the most advanced in the world, all of a sudden found itself among the exhausted, among the backward. Facing the information age, this great technological revolution, it found itself among the counterrevolutionaries.

YURY YARYM-AGAYEV: First of all, I would like to take away the credit for glasnost from Mr. Gorbachev. I want to stress two things: First, those changes are much more fundamental than the personality of Mr. Gorbachev or of some other people Aksyonov has mentioned. I think it is not so important who is in charge at this moment. The necessity for those changes has accumulated in this society.

And second, the form that these changes have taken, at least at this stage, can hardly be attributed to Gorbachev. I think we can take credit for these forms. The changes should have happened, no question about it. But the very fact that Gorbachev tried to meet just those demands which were for many years suggested by the human-rights movement in the Soviet Union, is important. If it weren't for the human-rights movement the word glasnost wouldn't exist now in the Soviet Union. There would be some changes, but I'm not sure that these changes would really start with the releases of some political prisoners, with reconsideration of Articles 70 and 190 and so on. So I wouldn't give us credit for the fact that changes have been made in the system, because deep economic and political processes demand them, but I think we can take credit for the forms, at least in this stage of those changes.

ERNST NEIZVESTNY: I would like to say that the answer to such questions cannot be relegated just to one point alone, or one reason. It is quite clear that these changes have taken place in connection with general global events. And with the lagging economy of the Soviet Union, and the Soviet Union's fear to lose its position. But the most amazing thing to note is that the changes began with the use of words, not deeds. "In the beginning, there was the word." One would think that for a materialistic society such as the Soviet Union, the fact that it all begins with words may seem strange. But for me, it's not so strange. I would like to present to you not an overall picture, but one from the artistic point of view, as if it were coming from within Soviet society, from the point of view of a man who still lives in the Soviet Union and who had the fortune or the misfortune to have had some contacts with the upper echelon of the regime. Consequently, these will not be thoughts, but stories.

I once had the opportunity to speak with a general who was the head of the Ideological Department of the KGB. His name was Philip. Phil. He told me that Weiner, the inventor of cybernetics, was completely correct when he said in his book *Cybernetics and Society*, that without feedback, society cannot survive. But he was wrong in thinking our society has no feedback. We do have feedback, he said, because the KGB is a kind of feedback. In the Soviet Union, the KGB realistically reports to the upper echelon the actual situation in the country.

And I conveyed this conversation to Comrade Anatoly Chernyayev, a man who now has a very high and close position to Gorbachev, and he said that's absurd. Hogwash. Absolute hogwash.

We need feedback, and sometimes literature and art create this feedback for us much better than any official sources. That's the first point I wanted to make.

Why was it that glasnost began with the process of rehabilitating certain participants or personalities in culture?

Because in Soviet society, there is a very strange attitude to art itself. Perhaps it is the only society that still sustains the idea that art is a kind of magic, witchcraft.

This is a unique, ancient view, this idea that in art there is an element of invocation or incantation. This is precisely why the authorities have always struggled severely against art. They firmly believe that if you create the image of heroes, everybody is going to turn into a hero. But when they became disenchanted with the information which official art was transmitting to them, they decided that they needed glasnost, openness. They changed names. They now want magic from others.

I want to start by suggesting a number of provocative premises. In a certain milieu, for quite some time now, there was indeed a certain degree of dissatisfaction with the sort of information which was coming out of art. And in principle, the generation of young Leninists have harbored all along a secret love for other kinds of heroes. Their fathers sang the song "Katyusha," and they, in secret, at the same time were studying the poetry of Gumilev and Pasternak.

Hedrick Smith in his book indicated that quite a number of persons who were a part of this elite had some of my art work in their homes. Brezhnev's assistants considered it to be an honor to stand at the door of the Lyubimov theater, and to serve as ushers.

Consequently, glasnost began, first of all, as Vladimir Bukovsky correctly stated, with samizdat, with art. This is a psychological factor. But there is a more profound factor as well. Now they realize that the discussion had gone so far that it is now not a matter of industrialization but the human material that is involved.

What they have finally realized is that the average person in the Soviet Union has now reached the end of his rope, from the moral point of view. This is why they are now giving us all these moral incantations: Don't drink, don't steal, teach yourselves to be disciplined human beings, and so on. And when you learn how to do that we will all start anew to reconstruct industry, the economy of the country, and defense.

And besides, the external factor is as follows: It is practically impossible to change anything, because there is no accurate information as to what is really going on, what is happening. In other words, they don't really know how many useful minerals there are in the country, how much gold, how much wealth they have. At least in the beginning, what they want is to acquire correct information, knowledge. And I believe that this they sincerely want, simply because they are afraid to continue to lag behind as they have been.

ALEKSANDR NEKRICH: Well, as to the word, glasnost. It is an old, old word, used in old Russia. I believe that in the middle of the nineteenth century this word was used very often. After the legal reforms in Russia in the 1860s, one of the writers of that time, Kurochkin, wrote a famous satire on glasnost. So there is nothing new in the origins.

The real development of present-day glasnost began after Brezhnev, not from the day Gorbachev came to power, but from the day Andropov started to rule. Gorbachev was really one of his people. I think so. I remember the first inaugural speech of Andropov in November 1982. He said to the members of the Central Committee that he did not intend to take responsibility for everything, that he would like to share responsibility with the other members of the Central Committee of the Party. That was a real beginning.

One of the laws that was introduced was about the so-called *Rabochiy Kollektiv* (the workers' collective or enterprise). Now Gorbachev tried to develop this thought and offered a draft of new laws, about the councils of workers at the enterprise. But one must look deeply into this draft, what its real purpose is, and ask whether it can make a real change in the framework of the system. I think this is the main point. What can be done and what can't.

The problem is that the Soviet state, despite all declarations of democracy, still is and will be, I think, a totalitarian state. The problem is that the special role of the Party and its way of thinking really limit the possibility of real democratic development in the Soviet Union. I remind you that Gorbachev, in his last speech, at the Congress of Trade Unions said, please, don't worry. Don't be afraid of democracy. Because we need democracy for the developing of discipline.

Andropov began his activity with this word, discipline, and Gorbachev continues the same magic word. First of all, discipline. Would it be helpful, this development of democracy? Maybe. But it depends on people. How do people, not the Party, operate on different levels? And Gorbachev, or course, understands this. That is why he travels across the country, talking with workers. He has decided to push them to do something, do something real. He asks them to develop democracy. But this democracy cannot be developed if in the state, in society, there is a special role for the Party.

VALENTIN TURCHIN: I am far from being euphoric about Gorbachev. Still, I think what he is doing is of extreme importance. And I want to give what may be called an anti-Marxist interpretation. Marxism, as you know, distinguishes the basis in society from the superstructure. The basis is the productive forces, and the superstructure is what people think, ideology, culture. According to Marxism, the dynamic element is the basis, and from time to time there is a sort of mismatch between the basis and the superstructure. Then the revolution comes, and puts them into correspondence.

I think that the opposite is more true. I believe that the superstructure is the more dynamic part and not the basis. What people think is the most important thing. And from time to time it becomes necessary to bring into correspondence with what people think the actual basis of those industrial and agricultural productive systems and laws and practices and so on.

So what is Gorbachev doing now? It is exactly this. He is bringing the superstructure into correspondence with what people think. Because people think differently now than they did twenty-five years ago.

Take for example, this word glasnost. Yes, it's true, of course, that it's an old Russian word. It was very important in the second half of the nineteenth century, but after the Communist revolution, it was thoroughly forgotten. It was the dissidents who reintroduced this word. And to see Gorbachev using this word was fascinating for me. So I agree completely with Yury Yarym-Agayev about that. I do think that he and I and Bukovsky and everybody here, together with writers and many people who are not dissidents, made their contribution to this change in how people think. We have certainly contributed to what is going on now.

I believe that Gorbachev himself probably thinks that what he is doing is eliminating obvious absurdities. Of course, it's absurd to keep Sakharov in Gorky. It's absurd to put people in jail just for writing letters to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and so on. It is absurd to cut informational channels and to prevent people from exchanging ideas in our society. That's true. And now they realize it's absurd.

But prior to this time people didn't think of these things as absurdities. Now it has changed, and for Gorbachev and for his associates it's quite natural to do what they are doing. They do think about it as just eliminating obvious absurdities.

How far they will be able to go is a different question. But what he is doing now, I believe, is bringing the basis into correspondence with the superstructure.

THOMAS VENCLOVA: There was a Russian critic in the middle of the nineteenth century whose name was Nikolay Gavrilovich Chernyshevsky. I am not a great fan of Mr. Chernyshevsky but he gave a famous and probably right definition of glasnost. He said something of the kind: glasnost is an invention of bureaucrats for abrogating the ideal of freedom of speech. But of course glasnost can be used, and must be used, for expanding the ideal of freedom of speech.

And I would like to make one more point. There are two tendencies in evaluating the present situation in the Soviet Union. Either euphoria, or a tendency to maintain that the Soviet system cannot change, that all the changes are just sort of devilish cunning. I disagree with that. We see real retreat, real concessions, brought on at least in part by the dissidents.

Are there any international aspects to the Soviet glasnost policy? For example, do the changes in Eastern Europe or China enter into this?

BUKOVSKY: Many people in the West believe that this change of heart---or whatever it is---comes from a sudden urge of the Soviet leadership to improve the well-being of the Soviet people, which is ridiculous. It's the least plausible explanation of the motive of their action. They couldn't care less about the well-being of their people.

But what is really dangerous for them is a challenge to the correlation of forces. And if you look at what they are doing, you understand why. It's not only that it is expensive to pay six million or now ten million dollars a day to Cuba, or two-and-a-half billion dollars to Angola and what not. But the expense is growing, because the nature of an empire is that unless it expands, it declines. We know this from history and Nekrich would confirm that. And therefore it grows more and more expensive. That's one thing. The same thing with competition, the East-West competition in the military field---it becomes more and more expensive. One of the major contributing forces to the talk about change is the Strategic Defense Initiative, I believe. Because that prompted the Soviet Union to try to rework the trend and to tie up everything. Suddenly, they saw they were faced with tremendous competition in the field in which they are least able to produce---that's high tech---demanding huge investments, and from which they will have the least possible spinoff for their civilian industry. That is very important, in my view.

And probably the beginning of all this---and a question with which Gorbachev and others could actually persuade the Party bureaucracy that they need real change---was the very simple question: What are we going to do, comrades, if tomorrow Cuba goes down the drain? Because that will affect immediately Angola, and Nicaragua, and then Ethiopia and other countries. And it will become the question of Poles and the Czechs and the Germans, who would probably follow the example. And if they go down the drain, then we have Balts, Ukrainians, Caucasians, and Central Asians, all of then crying out loud, demanding for themselves the same status.

That, I am sure, was a major factor---the major argument which they had discussed somewhere in the Politburo, or in the Central Committee, wherever they argue.

VLADIMIR MOROZOV: When I defected in October of last year, 1986, I first lived in Munich. The very first Westerners that I met asked me many times about these changes in the Soviet Union. And I answered them, guys, I first heard about these changes from you.

I lived inside this system. I was an investigative reporter. I traveled all over the country and followed up on the letters of readers that were sent to my magazine. I discussed the complaints, and I spoke with workers, engineers, directors, with trade union and Party leaders, from top to bottom. And I can tell you that nothing has changed. Nothing changes. Maybe texts, words. The only real change in Soviet life are the set of new laws prohibiting alcoholism. These are real laws, because they inflict strict punishment and make vodka expensive. One bottle of vodka now costs ten rubles and twenty kopeks. That's more than the average pay for a day's work.

Everybody now is repeating the term glasnost, but nobody knows what it means. In Munich, and here, some Americans have been asking me whether they are going to let up on censorship now that they are discussing openly many things, such as narcotics and drug addiction. And the areas of criticism have been somewhat expanded. I tried to explain that this term does not mean "open." There is not an open gate. The gates are just slightly ajar. And there are very interesting tricks in this glasnost, in this openness. For example, they begin to speak about these drug addicts. They usually tell about some local events, about some persons, but there is no information as a whole about drug addiction, for example, in the army, among students or in some groups of the population.

Then in *Pravda*, Aleksandr Vlasov, the Soviet Minister of the Interior, for the first time in the Soviet press, estimated the number of registered drug addicts in the Soviet Union---46,000. It was very interesting. Very interesting. It was an event. Why did he give this figure? Two lines later it became clear why. He estimated the number in the United States as 30 million. So the aim of this openness was very clear.

Yes, they told us, we have some problems, we have drug addicts and so on. Yes. And we try to solve these problems. But you see, life under capitalism, in that damned America, it's awful. 46,000 versus 30 million.

And then, this trade union congress showed very interesting things. They spoke about democratization, about the rights of workers' collectives, but in real life, for example, the new law made life harder for the workers. This law was only for propaganda, not to create real change, but to project the image of change.

This trade union congress approved a new law that decreed three and four shifts daily for workers instead of just one. They did it to have the equipment work all day. But for common people, it means a hardening of their life. Why? Because the transport system is very bad and there is a lack of food for workers. Also, the quality is terrible. In other words, there is a food problem. The change means workers will spend many hours going to their plants and again returning to their homes. It will be very bad for them, this new law.

AGAYEV: And if we come back to this question: What kind of opposition to Gorbachev, for example, could we expect in the Soviet Union in several years, I would expect more opposition from workers than from intellectuals simply because of these economic reasons. I think the level of peasant life will improve, because they will be given some opportunity for private enterprise, very limited, but some. And intellectuals, I think, will also get something, at least scientists and engineers. The increase in their salaries, I predict, will be much higher in coming years than the increase of the salaries of industrial workers, because high tech, I think will be a priority for the Government.

So that's a very fundamental process. I think it doesn't depend actually on Gorbachev or any single person. It's the nature of development of a Communist economy, which has come to such a point and I think nobody can stop it. I really cannot see what can be done by the Soviet government if they don't change dramatically the whole economic system. You know, it's very easy to publish Pasternak or Gumilev. It's not only not dangerous, it's easy, it's cheap, from an economic standpoint. But to feed workers---that's a much more difficult situation. It doesn't depend on the desire of Gorbachev, it depends on whether there is something to feed them.

And if you give more privileges to the peasants, it automatically increases the price of food. You know, the better off peasants are, the higher the prices for food. Industrial workers will find themselves in a more and more difficult situation.

So that's the basic process. It also relates to the political issue: Who would support Gorbachev's reforms, what groups of society would and would not support them? My impression is that ordinary people would not support Mr. Gorbachev very much. Some groups of intellectuals in Moscow and in Leningrad and in big cities would be supportive, at least for a while. But for ordinary people, publishing Gumilev and Pasternak and others, doesn't mean anything. What really matters to them is their standard of life, and I cannot see, in the near future, how it really can increase in the Soviet Union.

BUKOVSKY: Let's analyze the Party factor, because the question, as I understand it, is how much the Party can go along with these changes. How much is money a hindrance to these changes which they pretend they are going to introduce?

And that's a very interesting question. You quite rightly indicated that there is an independent development within the Soviet economy, whether the Party manages to control it or not. What does it produce in terms of, let's say, the attempt at social control within the country?

The ideal of communism---and when we speak about the Party, we have to think about ideology, that's their trade, that's their commodity, so to speak---the ideal was complete distribution by the state, right? They always try to return to it. Now that implies a complete control through the redistribution of goods and services in the country. This can't be done just with money. Money, ideally should be eliminated, as you know. So that made people completely dependent. In order to be promoted in that system, people were not required to be very good performers, or very efficient workers. They were required to have very good relations with the state, with the Party. That would advance them on the social ladder.

Now with alternatives appearing, with goods available for cash, a certain degree of the Party's control over the population is eroding. You don't need to have good relations with your management or the local Party authorities, if you can buy whatever you want---from an apartment to tomatoes.

AGAYEV: We should remember that everything is extremely competitive at this moment. To make real reforms, the Soviet Union has to become, to some extent, a partner in this international market. And we see very well that any country that has extensive internal restrictions is a loser in this market because of the restrictions, because the market is extremely competitive.

For example, Hungary is already in a rather bad situation, because it cannot compete. If the economy in the Soviet Union is not competitive according to the standards of the world market, it will eventually find itself in a very bad position.

NADIA SVITLYCHNA: In connection with the relationship of various forces, I believe it is very interesting to compare the central press in the Soviet Union with the press of the various national republics and to see what appears on both of these levels.

At the present time, central newspapers like *Literaturnaya Gazeta* (the Literary Gazette) and *Sovetskaya Rossiya*

(Soviet Russia) have become interesting. In comparison, corresponding Ukrainian Soviet newspapers like *Literaturna Ukraina* (Literary Ukraine) or *Radyanska Ukraina* (Soviet Ukraine) which are central Ukrainian newspapers [not to speak of more local papers, like *Selska Zhitya* (Country Life)], have changed very little, at least as of today.

NEKRICH: Don't worry, sooner or later, Gorbachev will get to you!

SVITLYCHNA: It almost appears as if in the Ukraine there is no one there to raise these sharp, poignant problems. But it is interesting to note that some Ukrainians do raise these controversial questions but in the Russian Soviet press, like *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, and not in their own, Urkainian literary newspapers.

What is very paradoxical is that even such a national tragedy as the Chernobyl disaster---and it is a national tragedy for the Ukrainians---got wide treatment in the central Russian Soviet press, but not in the Ukrainian local press. For example, Gubarev's play *Sarcophagus* appeared in *Znamya (The Banner)* but in the Ukraine not a single literary article on Chernobyl was published.

In the 1960s such questions, for example, as destroying the environment received a greater degree of coverage in the Ukraine than now in the 80s. I will not try to explain why this is happening, but would like to cite one example. Ivan Dratch, a leading Ukrainian poet who was very active in the 1960s and is less so now, suffered a very personal tragedy in connection with Chernobyl. His only son almost died in the Chernobyl disaster. In spite of this fact, I have never yet heard Dratch speak or discuss the Chernobyl accident.

And it seems to me that the use of terms like glasnost or democratization are injected into the vocabulary so that people will get used to using these unusual words, but they are not invoked so that people will really understand what is behind them, the reality of these terms, their meanings.

It seems as if these calls for glasnost and democratization are imposed on the people. And this is almost absurd, namely, that democracy is imposed. But that is what it looks like, concepts of democracy and glasnost are forcibly imposed. And of course there is the obvious aim at the Western audience. Even the experiment with Sakharov was calculated essentially for the West. His return to Moscow received a great deal of attention in the West, but remember that Sakharov still has had no access to his own Soviet press.

Is the USSR under Gorbachev more dangerous, less dangerous, or about the same?

TURCHIN: Well, I would say that if the Government is answerable to the people, it is less dangerous---if not, it as dangerous as before. For me there is no doubt that a democratic Russia will not pose the same danger as a totalitarian Russia. But unfortunately, Russia didn't become democratic under Gorbachev. In terms of danger, I think nothing has changed yet. And I don't see that it could change within several years. It will require much more time than that for these changes to be translated into a real political factor. Unfortunately we still have to wait for years.

AKSYONOV: In the long run I see the glasnost campaign in the history of the Soviet state as part of the destructing process, the gradual destruction of the Communists.

AGAYEV: Oh, not only in the Soviet state, in the world.

ASKYONOV: This is the time of twilight. It's an attempt to save this system and structure and in the long run we will see that it will be either changed drastically beyond recognition, or it will disintegrate.

BUKOVSKY: Well, I think they become more dangerous and will be more dangerous. Let's define this danger emanating from the Soviet Union. Clearly it is not the danger of nuclear war, because that they use as a bugaboo for children in the West. They are not going to incinerate themselves and others. That's not the danger. As long as we have protection and defenses and nerves enough to protect ourselves.

What is the real danger of the Soviet Union? It is precisely that either the West becomes too soft, and then the Soviets will begin to push it, which might generate actually a situation of confrontation. Or the Soviets are too skillful and they get the information and techniques they need and the West, so to speak, sells its soul to the Soviet Union. In clear terms, that might degenerate to a situation when the West will be sort of financing the building of communism across the world and in the Soviet Union. And that is exactly what the Soviets want. That's how they define détente, by the way. Détente in the Soviet definition is something which has no alternative, as they say. So that's exactly what they want to do.

In this sense, yes, of course, under Gorbachev the Soviet Union becomes much more dangerous. Because they become much more successful.

Will Mr. Gorbachev's efforts produce permanent change or are all changes, in all fields, reversible?

BUKOVSKY: Now what would be irreversible in my view? First alternative structures. If decentralization in the economy goes down to the level of individual enterprises, as Gorbachev has promised, if he really does that and makes enterprises self-sufficient, that will be very difficult to reverse. Incredibly difficult. But I don't think that is really happening at the moment.

I think we should come up with criteria of what would constitute irreversibility. First is duration; the change must last some time. Second is alternative structures, which I just mentioned. And a third is when the Soviets become more and more subject to external relations.

For example, when we speak about trade, the obvious question, the most dangerous question right now is at what stage should the West remove so-called barriers (as the Soviets call them), in international trade, and go with credit and with trade and joint ventures. In my view, if we want to deal with them really as a business partner, they must become a business partner. They must respect international liabilities, they should acknowledge their liability in international courts like the court in the Hague, or the court in Strasbourg, where an injured party can sue them. It's natural. If you have your deal, and the deal isn't followed by the other side, they must be responsible in a material sense. Would you deal with anybody whom you cannot force to pay? You wouldn't.

If you have another Chernobyl, and another destruction, where the hell are you going to sue them for that? Suppose it happened right now? That's one condition.

A second condition, I believe, is that they must make their currency convertible. And unless they do that, there is no sense at all in dealing with them in the economic sense.

AKSYONOV: That would be the most decisive point.

BUKOVSKY: That's the decisive point. If they do that, it will be extremely difficult for them to pull back.

What does the new climate mean for human rights activism in the Soviet Union? Does that mean that in a certain sense it ends the necessity for it?

NEKRICH: That depends on the human rights activists, also, not only on Gorbachev. But how they evaluate his moves, this is very important. I was really a little upset when I read in the newspaper about the telegram signed by some prominent dissidents that was sent to Gorbachev very soon after he declared his program. They sent this telegram supporting the three-day forum on nuclear disarmament held in Moscow. They did it too quickly, you know, without practical consideration. Of course there are some people who want to be first on every occasion and get on the bandwagon. But that is not a position for people who pretend to be politicians, not a position for people who pretend to represent a political movement. That is why I said that it depends not only on Gorbachev, but on his opponents also.

BUKOVSKY: Sure.

NEKRICH: What will be their policy? And they should just elaborate and make a very clear statement on this account if they can, of course. It is not so easy to make a clear statement now, when everything is moving rather fast. But what is clear is that Gorbachev tried to corrupt the intelligentsia. The intelligentsia in the Soviet Union is his main basis now. Not workers.

Have any of you seen the so-called television bridges that have been conducted by Phil Donohue? There are four or five of those now. Do you regard them as a contribution?

AGAYEV: Certainly not.

NEKRICH: It's controlled.

AGAYEV: Because you have just a governmental system from that side. We are always proponents of people-to-people communication, but not for people-to-structure communication.

What should be the West's response to the various changes? Should we---as Dr. Sakharov suggests---be careful not to "drive the USSR into a corner" by being overly cynical and unsupportive? Or should we be especially wary during negotiations with the USSR?

BUKOVSKY: It seems to me that the United States government, and the Europeans to some extent, are quite ready to rush into arms control. It is a tremendous blunder, in my view. A tremendous blunder. It's the worst time for them to do it right now. That shows that they are already not sufficiently skeptical, and it will open doors to so many other similar suggestions. It will give way to a huge euphoria. Why do we need it right now? We don't need it. It's a very wrong thing.

Let's wait. Let's wait three or four years. Nobody is going to war. I don't believe these missiles are going to explode tomorrow. It's all propaganda. Let's wait. That's an important point.

AKSYONOV: Would the reduction of arms improve their economic situation?

BUKOVSKY: No, it wouldn't. It would reduce the drive for changes. Now why are they so eager and so desperate to have those changes? Why? Because they cannot easily maintain their superpower status. If it's endangered, they will have to go further, spend more on their military.

If we just relax and give them local détentes and get off their backs, so to speak, then of course the whole thing will become cheaper for them to maintain and they will have little drive for reforms. Why should we do that? I think we should increase the pressure. I think it's a time for pressing them rather than for relaxing.

AKSYONOV: But don't you consider that there is inner resistance, the struggle between the factions in the Kremlin leadership, and that it would be wise, for a while, for a moment, to give Gorbachev some advantage?

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BIOGRAPHIES

Vassily Aksyonov

The Soviet Union's modern prose writer was forced to emigrate from the USSR under government pressure in July of 1980. His first novel, The Colleagues, published in 1960 during the heady period of Krushchev's "thaw," propelled the 26-year-old author to national stardom.

After the fall of Krushchev, when the thaw had turned into a freeze, Mr. Aksyonov signed letters of protest against political trials, and was consequently forbidden to have his work published in the Soviet Union.

Mr. Aksyonov's conflict with the Soviet authorities came to a head in 1979, when an anthology of new wave Soviet writers and poets, Metropol, edited primarily by Mr. Aksyonov, was also published in the West. Both the collection and Mr. Aksyonov were fiercely denounced by Soviet literary authorities. Subjected to constant harassment and censorship, Mr. Aksyonov resigned from the Soviet Union of Writers and emigrated with his wife to the West.

Mr. Aksyonov lives in Washington, D.C., and is writer-in-residence at both Johns Hopkins University and Goucher College in Baltimore, MD. He also teaches seminars on comparative literature and has widely lectured on campuses across the United States.

Vladimir Bukovsky

In 1963, when he was 20 years old, Mr. Bukovsky was arrested for the first time because two photocopies of Milovan Djilas's book, The New Class, were found in his home. He was committed to a special psychiatric prison hospital in Leningrad and released in 1965. He later described the experience as, "15 months of hell," but his dedication to the cause of civil liberties did not falter. On December 5 of that year, he organized a demonstration in support of the arrested writers Andrei Sinyavsky and Yuli Daniel and was again committed to an insane asylum, this time for eight months.

In January 1967 he was arrested for the third time, for organizing a public demonstration in protest against the arrest of four fellow dissidents. On this occasion, the authorities sentenced him to the Bor labor camp, near Voronezh, for three years.

After his release from prison camp, he spent a year extensively documenting the use of Soviet psychiatry for political purposes. In January 1971 Bukovsky transmitted to the West copies of psychiatric "diagnoses" of six dissidents being held in mental hospitals, thereby exposing the Soviet practice of psychiatric reprisal against sane persons of dissenting political beliefs. For this unforgivable transgression, Bukovsky was rearrested in March 1971 and sentenced to 12 years.

In December 1976 after a world-wide campaign for his release, Bukovsky was exchanged for imprisoned Chilean Communist Party leader Luis Corvalan. At the time, Bukovsky was 34 years old and he had served 11 years in prison.

Mr. Bukovsky received his B.S. from Cambridge University in England, and in 1986 he earned his M.S. from Stanford University in neurobiology. Mr. Bukovsky now resides in England.

Vladimir Morozov

A graduate of Moscow State University with a degree in journalism. After completing his college studies in 1968, he worked as a reporter for Gudok (The Whistle), a newspaper published by the Ministry of Railroads and for Sotsialisticheskaya Industriya (Socialist Industry), an organ of the Central Committee of the CPSU.

In 1976 he worked for a year as an editor of Nash Sovremennik (Our Contemporary), published by the Union of Writers in Moscow. After that Mr. Morozov was employed for nine years as an assistant editor of Sotsialisticheskiye Profsoyuzy (Soviet Trade Unions).

In October 1986 when he was visiting West Germany as a part of a Soviet tourist group, Mr. Morozov defected and asked for political asylum in the United States. He arrived in New York in late December and since January 1987, he has been working as an editor of Novoye Russkoye Slovo, the Russian-language daily published in New York.

Professor Aleksandr Nekrich

Prof. Nekrich received his doctoral and post-doctoral degree in history from the Institute of History of the USSR Academy of Sciences in Moscow. He worked as a Senior Scholar at the same institute from 1950 to 1976, at which time he emigrated to the West.

In 1978 W.W. Norton published his volume, The Punished Peoples, an extensive study describing the deportation and fate of Soviet minorities at the end of World War II. His most recent book (written jointly with Michael Heller), Utopia in Power, was published in 1986.

At the present time Prof. Nekrich lives in Boston, and is an associate at the Russian Research Center of Harvard University.

Nadia Svitlychna

A Ukrainian writer and editor and prominent participant for national and human rights in her native Ukraine. She was arrested in April 1972 for protesting a massive wave of arrests of dissidents that had also claimed her brother, literary critic Ivan Svitlychny, as one of its victims. After 11 months in an investigative prison, Mrs. Svitlychna was tried and sentenced on March 23, 1973, to four years' imprisonment on charges of "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda." Mrs. Svitlychna spent four years in Mordovian Labor Camp No. 3.

There, under conditions of near starvation and inadequate medical care, she worked as a seamstress, sewing her daily quota of 120 gloves. While imprisoned, Mrs. Svitlychna continued her activities on behalf of human rights, participating in hunger strikes and writing protests and appeals.

After her release from prison she could not get a position to fit her qualifications, and she was forced to work as a streetsweeper, a job which she later also lost.

In November 1978, Mrs. Svitlychna emigrated from the USSR with her two sons and arrived in the United States soon after. Her husband joined her at a later date. She is currently a member of the External Representation of the Ukrainian Helsinki Watch Group and works as an editor in the Ukrainian section of Radio Liberty in New York.

Dr. Valentin Turchin

Dr. Turchin has been active in the Soviet human rights movement since 1968. In 1970 he was the co-author, along with Dr. Andrei Sakharov and Roy Medvedev, of an open letter addressed to the Soviet leaders, calling for the democratization of the Soviet Union and the necessity of overcoming its pressing economic and social problems.

In 1973 Dr. Turchin founded the Moscow chapter of Amnesty International and became its chairman. He was also a leading Soviet physicist, until these and other human rights activities led to his dismissal in 1974 from the Institute for Applied Mathematics of the Academy of Sciences. No longer able to continue his professional career, he emigrated from the Soviet Union with his family in 1977.

At the present time Dr. Turchin is Professor of Computer Science at City College, City University of New York, and he lives in Oakland, New Jersey.

Dr. Yury Yarym-Agayev

In the mid-1970's, Dr. Agayev began to contribute to the Soviet underground journal of the human rights movement, the Chronicle of Current Events. Dr. Agayev's first public statements were made in defense of his friend and fellow student at the Physical Technical Institute, Anatoly Shcharansky, and he continued to organize campaigns in defense of other dissenters, such as Kirill and Alexander Podrabinek.

In 1978 Dr. Agayev joined the Moscow Helsinki Watch Group and as a member helped author and release more than 50 documents describing a large variety of human rights violations of the Helsinki accords.

Because of these and other human rights activities Dr. Agayev was often detained by the KGB. In 1980 he was given a choice by the Soviet authorities either to emigrate to the West or be imprisoned. Dr. Agayev arrived in the United States with his wife in July of that year.

In the United States Dr. Agayev continued his professional activities as a physicist at MIT and Stanford University. He is now with Bell Communications Research in New Jersey. In 1986 Dr. Agayev organized the New York-based Center for Democracy, which monitors human rights violations in the Soviet Union and urges greater openness in Soviet society.

Ernst Neizvestny

Mr. Neizvestny is generally regarded as the best-known artist to have left the Soviet Union. Primarily known for his monumental sculptures, Mr. Neizvestny's name was projected onto the world scene in 1962, when he dared to engage Prime Minister Nikita Krushchev in a public debate at an exhibition of unofficial Soviet art. After the two men's argument on the merits of modern art came to a close, Mr. Krushchev became the sculptor's friend and admirer, and it was Mr. Neizvestny who sculpted the Soviet leader's tombstone after his death.

Although Soviet authorities bestowed commissions and honors upon him, Neizvestny craved to paint and sculpt in freedom. In 1977 he finally managed to emigrate. Since that time he has been working in his studio in the Soho district of New York.

Professor Thomas Venclova

A Lithuanian poet and literary scholar, Prof. Venclova graduated from Vilnius University with a degree in Lithuanian literature.

Prof. Venclova was one of the five founding members of the Lithuanian Helsinki Watch Group, founded in November 1976. In November 1977 Venclova was allowed to accept an invitation from Berkeley University as a visiting lecturer, and soon after his arrival in the United States, he was stripped of his Soviet citizenship.

Since his arrival in the United States, Prof. Venclova's poetry and articles have appeared in The New York Review of Books, The New Republic, Encounter magazine, and in numerous other publications. His writing has been translated into 15 languages. He has also published five books, including two volumes of poetry, two books of essays, and a scholarly work on Russian literature.

Prof. Venclova received his Ph.D. in Russian literature from Yale University. Since 1980 he has been living in New Haven and teaching Russian and Polish literature and the Lithuanian language at Yale University.

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